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OPEN DOORWAY ARRESTS:  HAS MCCLISH V. 
NUGENT TRULY CHANGED THE ANALYSIS?   
At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right 
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion1. . .[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Local police have probable cause to believe John Smith has been 
distributing illegal firearms from his residence.  Smith has not been 
living in the area long and has been operating out of a rented apartment.  
The police believe Smith may know that his activities have gained their 
attention, and three officers quickly make their way to Smith’s apartment 
to arrest him without a warrant.  Although the officers would normally 
obtain a warrant to make this type of felony arrest, they are fearful that 
Smith may leave the area before he can be apprehended. 
After the police locate Smith’s apartment, they approach the 
doorway.  Smith’s apartment does not have a common area at its 
entrance, and nothing separates the officers from the interior of Smith’s 
apartment except for a closed front door.  One officer knocks on the 
door, but the officers do not announce their presence outside of the 
apartment.  Responding to the knock, Smith opens the door to the 
officers and proceeds to remain standing near the doorway of his 
apartment.  Can the police arrest him in this situation?3 
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures has led to the development of several important rules 
regarding arrest.4  First, a warrantless arrest of an individual, conducted 
in a public place, is valid as long as the arrest is supported by probable 
cause.5  Second, police are required to obtain a warrant in order to arrest 
an individual who remains within the privacy of his or her own home.6  
                                                 
1 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
3 This hypothetical is loosely based on typical warrantless doorway arrest scenarios that 
are examined throughout this Note. 
4 See infra Part II.A (discussing the constitutionality of warrantless arrests in public 
places, in the doorway of the home, and within the privacy of the home). 
5 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1976). 
6 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits police from making an entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine 
felony arrest if a warrant has not been obtained and the suspect has not given consent for 
the police to enter). 
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Subject to only a few exceptions,7 police officers are not allowed to 
physically pass through the threshold of a doorway to conduct an arrest 
within the home absent a warrant, even if probable cause exists.8  This 
Note addresses whether the warrant requirement applies if police intend 
to arrest an individual who voluntarily opens his or her door in response 
to a knock by the police and remains standing in the threshold of the 
doorway:  not quite within the privacy of the home, but not standing 
fully outside of the open doorway either. 
A majority of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals hold that 
warrantless open doorway arrests conducted under these particular 
circumstances are presumptively legal.9  Although these circuits have 
rejected the legality of open doorway arrests in certain instances, this 
does not amount to an outright rejection of the principle at hand.10  
While various authors contend that judicial decisions on warrantless 
doorway arrests are inconsistent,11 it was not until the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s recent outlier decision in McClish v. 
Nugent in 2007 that a circuit split actually existed on this particular 
issue.12 
This Note takes the position that warrantless open doorway arrests 
are valid under the Fourth Amendment and are consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent.13  Part II of this Note explains the constitutionality of 
                                                 
7 Id. at 588–89 (noting that an arrest within the home involves an invasion of the 
sanctity of the home, and a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent exigent 
circumstances such as consent, is too substantial an invasion of privacy to be allowed even 
when probable cause exists). 
8 Id. at 589–90 (explaining that an arrest within the home is plainly subject to the 
warrant requirement and the existence of probable cause, alone, is insufficient to validate 
the arrest). 
9 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have upheld 
warrantless open doorway arrests as constitutionally valid under the Fourth Amendment). 
10 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have declined to 
uphold warrantless doorway arrests based on the fact that police fully penetrated the 
privacy of the home or used coercive tactics to gain entry to the home). 
11 See Jennifer Marino, Note, Does Payton Apply:  Absent Consent or Exigent Circumstance, 
Are Warrantless, In-Home Police Seizures and Arrests of Persons Seen Through an Open Door of 
the Home Legal?, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 569, 579–87 (2005) (arguing that the circuits have 
interpreted and applied the requirements of Payton differently, and the fact that different 
results have been reached in factually distinguishable cases has caused a circuit split on the 
issue of warrantless open doorway arrests); Evan B. Citron, Note, Say Hello and Wave 
Goodbye:  The Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2761, 2786 (2006) (contending that two conflicting views, referred to as the “voluntary 
exposure view” and ‘“sanctity’ view[,]” have been adopted by the circuits in an attempt to 
resolve the dispute over the constitutionality of warrantless open doorway arrests). 
12 McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a warrantless open 
doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into the private confines of the home that violates the 
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton). 
13 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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warrantless arrests conducted in public areas and explores decisions by 
the United States Courts of Appeals involving open doorway arrests.14  
Part III analyzes factors courts have emphasized in upholding and 
invalidating warrantless doorway arrests, argues that courts have 
consistently applied Supreme Court precedent in evaluating the validity 
of these arrests, and concludes that the decision of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in McClish represents a confused interpretation of the 
key aspects that must be examined in a warrantless doorway arrest 
case.15  Finally, Part IV proposes a standard of model reasoning that 
should be applied to resolve future cases involving warrantless doorway 
arrests based upon Fourth Amendment principles, United States 
Supreme Court precedent, and the decisions of the circuit courts 
examined throughout this Note.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment affords general protection to individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, but its protections are not 
absolute and can be surrendered.17  First, Part II.A outlines a general 
explanation of Fourth Amendment principles related to warrantless 
arrests conducted in public areas and explains the significance of United 
States v. Watson, a pivotal Supreme Court decision upholding the validity 
of such arrests.18  Second, Part II.A discusses the Supreme Court 
decisions of United States v. Santana and Payton v. New York, that together 
establish the legal scope of warrantless open doorway arrests.19  Part II.B 
then explains how the circuit courts have interpreted and applied the 
principles of Santana and Payton to resolve open doorway arrest cases.20  
                                                 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
By these explicit terms, the Fourth Amendment affords individuals only a right, rather than 
a guarantee, of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
18 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the protections offered to individuals by the Fourth 
Amendment and the general principle that probable cause, alone, is sufficient to support an 
arrest carried out in a public area); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
19 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)); infra Part 
II.A.3 (discussing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
20 See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have both 
upheld and invalidated warrantless doorway arrests). 
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Finally, Part II.C discusses McClish v. Nugent, a controversial decision 
which caused a circuit split regarding the validity of warrantless open 
doorway arrests.21 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Its Application To Arrest 
The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of individuals to remain 
secure in their persons and homes against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.22  The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment stems 
from eighteenth-century concerns over the prevalence of arbitrary 
searches and seizures of property.23  More recently, however, the 
protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment has been 
interpreted to apply primarily to the individual.24  While the Supreme 
                                                 
21 See infra Part II.C; see also McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007). 
22 See supra note 17 (quoting the text of the Fourth Amendment); see also WAYNE W. 
GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK:  A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 7 (2003) (explaining that seizure of a person has been defined 
both as “police use of actual force [which] achieves a restraining effect on a suspect,” and 
as a ‘“show of force’ . . . [coupled with] an actual submission by the suspect[]”). 
23 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:  Property, Privacy, or 
Security, 33 WAKE. FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment 
was a creature of eighteenth-century concern for the protection of property rights against 
arbitrary and general searches and seizures) (citing Edward L. Barrett Jr., Personal Rights, 
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 60 (1960)) (tracing the 
developments that resulted in interpreting the Fourth Amendment to afford greater 
protection to property rights than to personal liberty); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 617, 626–30 (1886) (reviewing the historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
24 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places); see also Sean M. Lewis, The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway:  
Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of 
Their Apartment Buildings?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 273, 275 n.11 (2002) (explaining that the 
protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is 
aimed at the protection of the individual) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351); see also Stephen 
Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy:  Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth 
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914 (1997).  Jones argues that the Supreme 
Court “made it clear in Katz that the ‘person’ provided for in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment extended beyond the physical body.  The Fourth Amendment ‘person’ 
included peoples’ expectations that their activity will remain private.”  Id.  Jones explains 
that Justice Black framed this debate in his dissenting opinion in Katz: 
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the 
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court 
began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a 
law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an 
individual's privacy.  By clever word juggling the Court finds it 
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and 
seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect 
privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that 
can neither be searched nor seized.  Few things happen to an 
individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another . . . . The 
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Court has not created an absolute rule requiring police to obtain a 
warrant in order to make an arrest, the Court has expressed a preference 
that such warrants should be obtained if possible.25  However, a mere 
preference for obtaining arrest warrants does not require a court to 
invalidate an arrest simply because the police did not, or were not able 
to, obtain a warrant.26  The central issue that must be examined in cases 
dealing with a Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless arrests is 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy of the individual has been 
violated.27  After first upholding the constitutionality of warrantless 
                                                                                                             
Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”  No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give 
this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything 
which affects privacy. 
Id. at 914–15 n.22. (Black, J., dissenting). 
25 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (holding that the informed 
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what types of searches 
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution is preferred over the actions of law 
enforcement officers making arrests); see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 
(1965) (stating that the informed decisions of magistrates empowered to issue warrants is 
preferred over the hurried actions of officers who may make arrests); United States v. Leon, 
486 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984) (explaining that the Court has expressed a strong preference for 
warrants to be obtained as a reliable safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
26 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976).  The Court explicitly lent support for 
this principle in Watson: 
Congress has plainly decided against conditioning warrantless arrest 
power on proof of exigent circumstances.  Law enforcement officers 
may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where practicable to do so, and 
their judgments about probable cause may be more readily accepted 
where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate.  But we decline to 
transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the 
judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize 
warrantless public arrests [based] on probable cause rather than to 
encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to 
the existence of exigent circumstances[] . . .  
Id. at 423–24 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted); see also GREENHALGH, supra note 22, at 
18 (explaining that warrantless arrests are reasonable “because that is the way it has always 
been done[]”). 
27 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that each individual has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment).  In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan expressed the idea that the 
Fourth Amendment set forth a twofold requirement in determining what type of protection 
should be afforded to individuals.  Id. at 361.  Harlan explained “first that a person [must] 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  Id.; see also 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (explaining that the Court in Katz held that the 
capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the 
individual who claims such protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
820 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
public arrests in United States v. Watson, the Court later expanded upon 
this principle and further refined the parameters of warrantless arrests in 
two landmark cases, Santana and Payton.28 
1. Warrantless Arrests and United States v. Watson 
In United States v. Watson, the Supreme Court held that warrantless 
felony arrests made in a public place and based on probable cause are 
valid.29  In its opinion, the Court emphasized the fact that the existence of 
probable cause surrounding an arrest strongly supports the validity of 
such an arrest, even if a warrant has not been obtained.30  The principles 
                                                                                                             
invaded area); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (explaining that the capacity to 
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether an individual who 
claims the protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy).  See also Jones, supra note 24, 
at 908.  Jones explains that “[t]he concept of ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ is at the 
forefront of all Fourth Amendment analysis. . . . If a defendant does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an area searched or an item seized [(including a person)], he does 
not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation.”  Id. at 908.  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1 (2007) (analyzing the Katz expectation of privacy test). 
28 See infra Part II.A.1, Part II.A.2, and Part II.A.3 (discussing Watson, Santana, and 
Payton, respectively). 
29 Watson, 423 U.S. at 416–24.  In Watson, police armed with probable cause but no 
warrant arrested Watson in a public restaurant for possession of stolen credit cards.  Id. at 
412–13.  The Court held that Watson’s warrantless arrest was valid and did not violate his 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 424.  In its opinion, the Court first based its holding on 
the fact that “[t]he cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient 
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a 
misdemeanor or felony . . . if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”  Id. at 418 
(citations omitted).  The Court next determined that “[t]he balance struck by the common 
law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without a warrant, has 
survived substantially intact.   It appears in almost all of the States in the form of express 
statutory authorization.”  Id. at 421–22.  Finally, the Court expressed its belief that the 
preceding principles indicated that “Congress has plainly decided against conditioning 
warrantless arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances.”  Id. at 423 (footnote omitted).   
30 Id. at 416–18.  The Court explained that certain law enforcement officers have been 
statutorily authorized to make felony arrests based upon probable cause but without 
warrants for many years.  Id. at 416.  The Court then reasoned that there was no existing 
precedent indicating that a warrant was required to make a valid arrest for a felony under 
the Fourth Amendment; its prior decisions were actually uniformly against this principle.  
Id. at 416–17.  Most importantly, the Court concluded that the necessary inquiry in these 
types of cases dealing with public arrest “was not whether there was a warrant or whether 
there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest.”  Id. at 417; 
see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (noting that the Court has never 
invalidated an arrest that was supported by probable cause based solely on the fact that the 
police officers failed to secure a warrant); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963) 
(opinion of Clark, J.) (explaining that the lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant must be 
based upon probable cause); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (stating that the 
crucial question in this case was whether there was probable cause for the arrest; if there 
was, the arrest although it was without a warrant, was lawful); OTIS H. STEPHENS & 
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supporting warrantless public arrests articulated by the Court in Watson 
have been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and consistently applied by 
the circuit courts.31  After Watson, it was not entirely clear how far its 
holding could be extended and whether the warrant requirement would 
apply if the individual the police sought to arrest was standing in plain 
view in an open doorway; the Court had an opportunity to resolve these 
questions in United States v. Santana.32 
2. Warrantless Public Arrests and United States v. Santana 
In Santana, the Supreme Court extended the principles of Watson to 
apply to doorway arrests, holding that the defendant’s warrantless arrest 
was valid because she knowingly exposed herself to police officers at the 
                                                                                                             
RICHARD A. GLENN, UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:  RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER 
THE LAW 294 (2006) (stating that “[a]n officer’s on-the-scene determination of probable 
cause provides the legal justification both for the arrest and the subsequent brief detention 
necessary to take the administrative steps incident to the arrest[]”).   
31 See United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that a warrantless 
arrest by a law enforcement officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in 
situations where the arrest is in a public place and there is probable cause for the arrest); 
United States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that it is well-
established that there is nothing in prior cases indicating that the Fourth Amendment 
requires a warrant for a valid felony arrest to be effectuated); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 362 (2001) (holding that based upon Watson, the existence of probable cause is 
a sufficient condition for arrest); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that the Court has never elevated its judicial preference for arrest warrants to 
the level of a per se rule that mandates warrants for all arrests regardless of the existence of 
probable cause); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 216–17 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that an 
officer may conduct a warrantless arrest so long as probable cause exists to believe that the 
suspect committed a crime); United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Watson, 423 U.S. at 421–24) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not violated 
by a warrantless felony arrest carried out in a public place); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 
14, 18 (1990) (stating that it has long been settled that a warrantless arrest in a public place 
is permissible as long as the arresting officer has probable cause); Crane v. State of Texas, 
759 F.2d 412, 424 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Watson, 423 U.S. at 416–17) (noting that “there is 
nothing in the Court’s prior cases indicating that under the Fourth Amendment a warrant 
is required to make a valid arrest for a felony[]”); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 366 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (stating that it is clear that an arrest may be effected in a public place without a 
warrant); United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 580 (1980) (stating that under Watson, 
personal seizure alone does not require a warrant); United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 
1299 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that a warrantless arrest in a public place does not constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 419 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(upholding the validity of a warrantless arrest made in a public place if carried out by a 
police officer armed with probable cause); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 
1978) (explaining that Watson was the first square holding to permit a law enforcement 
officer to make a warrantless arrest in a public place after developing probable cause for 
the arrest). 
32 See infra Part II.A.2. 
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doorway of her home—which is a public place.33  In examining the 
circumstances of the arrest, the Court explained that the first and most 
important question to decide was whether Santana was present in a 
public place at the time of the arrest.34  The Court determined that 
because Santana had been standing at the doorway of her home when 
she was arrested, “[s]he was not in an area where she had any 
expectation of privacy.”35  The Court emphasized that Santana’s 
warrantless arrest was valid because she had been standing in the 
doorway of her home—a public place—and in doing so she voluntarily 
exposed herself to public view before the police arrested her.36 
The Santana decision stands for two important principles in the 
context of warrantless doorway arrests:  first, consistent with Watson, 
                                                 
33 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).  In Santana, the police had received 
information that Dominga Santana was involved in a drug purchase with an undercover 
agent.  Id. at 39–40.  The police, with probable cause, approached Santana’s house and 
observed her standing in the open doorway of her home.  Id. at 40.  Santana saw the police 
and attempted to run into her home to escape from the officers, and the officers followed 
her through the open doorway and caught her in the vestibule of her home.  Id.  The Court 
held that Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid because she had knowingly exposed 
herself to police officers in the doorway of her home, which is a public place.  Id. at 42. 
34 Id.  According to the Court, Santana was standing directly in the doorway when the 
police arrived; one step forward would have put her outside the home, and one step 
backward would have put her inside her home.  Id. at 40 n.1.  In distinguishing between 
public and private areas in relation to the home, the Court explained that “[w]hile it may be 
true that under the common law of property the threshold of one’s dwelling is ‘private,’ as 
is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a ‘public’ place.”  Id. at 42; see also 5 AM. JUR. 2d 
Arrest § 97 (2007) (explaining that the doorway is considered to be a public place for 
purposes of warrantless arrest). 
35 Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.  The Court explained that based on the fact that Santana was 
standing in an open doorway, which is a public place, “[s]he was not merely visible to the 
public[,] but was exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been 
standing completely outside her house.”  Id.  (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 
(1924) (stating that “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the 
people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields[]”)).  
The Court then explained that because Santana had knowingly exposed herself to the 
public in this manner, she could not claim a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy.  Id.  
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection[]”)).  The Court stated that based upon both of these factors, 
Santana had not been “in an area where she had any [reasonable] expectation of privacy.”  
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.  Therefore, the Court concluded that Santana’s arrest was 
constitutionally valid because the police, in making the arrest, “merely intended to perform 
a function which [the Court had] approved [of] in Watson.”  Id. at 42. 
36 Id.  The Court explained that because Defendant Santana was knowingly standing in 
the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an area in 
which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. 
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when a person stands in the doorway of his or her home, that person will 
be deemed to be in a public place for purposes of arrest.37  Second, as 
long as probable cause exists for such an arrest to be made, the arrest 
cannot be deemed invalid because a person knowingly standing in a 
public place has surrendered any expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.38  Even after Santana, however, the scope of 
warrantless doorway arrests did not become entirely clear until the 
Supreme Court decided Payton v. New York four years later. 
3. Warrantless Private Arrests and Payton v. New York 
In Payton, the Court limited the scope of its holding in Santana by 
invalidating warrantless arrests that occurred beyond the threshold of 
the open doorway of the home.39  The Payton decision was based upon 
the Court’s examination of two related cases, both of which addressed 
the legality of arrests carried out after police made actual entries into the 
privacy of the home.40  Based upon both sets of facts, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a 
warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to 
make a routine felony arrest.41 
The Court stressed that in both cases the police made their seizures 
after walking through the doorway and into the physical vicinity of the 
                                                 
37 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
38 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
39 United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house, and, absent exigent circumstances, the 
threshold of the doorway may not reasonably be crossed to make an arrest unless a 
warrant has first been obtained). 
40 Id. at 574.  In the first case, Payton v. New York, the police had gathered evidence 
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant Payton for his connection with a 
recent murder.  Id. at 576.  The police had not obtained a warrant and went to Payton’s 
apartment intending to arrest him.  Id.  Payton did not respond to repeated knocks on the 
door and the police proceeded to use crowbars to break open the door and enter the 
vicinity of the apartment.  Id.  Although Payton was not present at the apartment, the 
police seized a shotgun casing that was later used at Payton’s murder trial.  Id. at 576–77.  
In the second case, Riddick v. New York, police went to the apartment of defendant Riddick 
to arrest him for armed robbery though they had not first obtained a warrant.  Id. at 578.  
The police knocked on the door of Riddick’s home in mid-day, and Riddick’s son answered 
the door.  Id.  Through the open doorway of the home, the police were able to see Riddick 
sitting in a bed covered by a sheet.  Id.  The police subsequently entered Riddick’s 
apartment and placed him under arrest.  Id. 
41 Id. at 576.  In its conclusion, the Court relied on a basic reading of the text of the 
Fourth Amendment, stating that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that 
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”  
Id. at 586.  The Court then ultimately held that a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent 
exigent circumstances such as consent, is an unlawful invasion of an individual’s right to 
privacy that cannot be allowed even when probable cause exists.  Id. at 588–89. 
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defendant’s home, an obvious infringement past the threshold of the 
doorway.42  In addition, the warrantless arrests made in Payton fell 
beyond the scope of the types of arrests that had been previously upheld 
in Watson.43  These factors led the Court to ultimately conclude that a 
warrantless entry into the privacy of the home is presumptively 
unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.44 
In sum, Santana holds that a doorway is a public place and that an 
individual knowingly and voluntarily standing in such an area has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.45  
Payton establishes the doorway as the threshold that distinguishes the 
public from the private area of the home, and holds that an individual 
who remains firmly within his home cannot be lawfully arrested without 
a warrant, absent exigent circumstances.46  By remaining within one’s 
                                                 
42 Id. at 589.  The Court explained that while the Fourth Amendment protects the 
privacy of an individual in a wide variety of settings, the zone of its protection is most 
clearly defined by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.  Id.  The 
Court found strong support for this principle in its textual interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, stating that “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of 
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.”  Id. at 589–90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
43 Payton, 445 U.S. at 598–99.  The Court stated that while its decision in Watson 
regarding the validity of a public arrest “was supported by cases directly in point and by 
the unanimous views of the commentators,” it had not located any “direct authority 
supporting forcible entries into a home to make a routine arrest” nor had it found any 
scholarly opinions supporting this view.  Id. at 598. 
44 Id.  at 590.  The Court held that “[i]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property 
and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to 
the house.  Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.”  Id. 
45 See supra note 36 (explaining that because the defendant Santana was knowingly 
standing in the doorway of her home, which is considered a public place, she was not in an 
area in which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
46 See supra note 44 (explaining the Court’s holding in Payton).  The term exigent 
circumstances has been defined as “[a] situation in which a police officer must take 
immediate action to effectively make an arrest, search, or seizure for which probable cause 
exists, and thus may do so without first obtaining a warrant.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
260 (8th ed. 2004); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that 
exigent circumstances combined with probable cause may excuse police officers from 
complying with the warrant requirement) (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 
(1925)); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing, as examples of 
exigent circumstances, cases involving the pursuit of a fleeing suspect, putting out a fire in 
a burning building, breaking up a violent fight, or attending to the victim of a stabbing).  
Notably, however, a clear definition of exigent circumstances was absent from the Court’s 
opinion in Payton.  See also Warrantless Entry to Arrest in Suspect’s Home:  Payton v. New York, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 178, 185–86 (1980) (explaining that a flaw in the Payton decision is that the 
Court failed to define exigent circumstances, and because exigent circumstances can mean 
different things to different people, Payton should be read as allowing warrantless arrests 
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home, which is clearly beyond the threshold of the doorway, an 
individual retains an expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment that cannot be infringed upon.47 
B. Decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals Regarding Warrantless 
Open Doorway Arrests 
1. Major Decisions Upholding Warrantless Open Doorway Arrests 
Almost all of the circuits have addressed the issue of warrantless 
open doorway arrests since Santana and Payton.48  Specific decisions of 
the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals tend to provide the 
most direct support for the constitutional validity of such arrests.49  
Cases decided by other Courts of Appeals also lend support to the 
notion that warrantless doorway arrests are generally upheld.50  To 
                                                                                                             
only in situations “that police reasonably believe must be made immediately to avert loss 
of life, harm to the innocent, destruction of evidence, or flight of a suspect[]”). 
47 Payton, 445 U.S. at 588–89 (explaining that an arrest within the home involves an 
invasion of the sanctity of the home, and a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent 
exigent circumstances such as consent, is too substantial an invasion of privacy to be 
allowed even when probable cause exists); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (stating that each individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
48 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
49 See infra Part II.B.1.a (discussing United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 
1987)); infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995)); 
infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996)).  
50 See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that no individual 
in a place open to public view can expect privacy in that place and at that time, whether he 
is at the threshold of the doorway, in a vestibule of the home, or at the far end of an 
exposed interior room).  The Gori court noted that “[o]nce a door is voluntarily opened by 
an occupant in response to a knock by someone invited by an occupant, the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of the home is not abrogated so long as the officer's conduct was 
reasonable under the circumstances.”  Id.  The Gori court then stated that a person who 
opens the door to a dwelling in response to a knock opens to view whatever can be seen by 
the invitee, and those inside can no longer maintain any heightened expectation of privacy.  
Id.  The court finally explained that “[t]he idea that Santana turns on the defendant’s 
location is, . . . ‘unsound from the standpoint of both principle and pragmatism[][.]’”  Id.  
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(e) at 256–57 (1996)); see also Knight 
v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Payton does not prevent 
police from telling a suspect to step outside his home and then arresting him without a 
warrant because the officer never crosses “the firm line at the entrance to the house” in 
effecting the arrest); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that courts have generally upheld arrests “where the police go to a person’s 
home without a warrant, knock on the door, announce from outside the home the person is 
under arrest when he opens the door to answer, and the person acquiesces to the arrest[]”); 
Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that “it [is] unwise to become 
preoccupied with the exact location of the individual in relation to the doorway. . . . 
[Because] the crucial issues involve the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and 
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highlight these principles, decisions of the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals are discussed next. 
a. United States v. Carrion 
In Carrion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant’s doorway arrest, which took place in the doorway of the 
defendant’s hotel room after he voluntarily opened the door, was valid 
and did not violate the warrant requirement implemented in Payton.51  In 
its reasoning, the court relied heavily on its previous decision in United 
States v. Mason.52  Notably, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
that the Mason opinion gave no exact specification of the Defendant 
Mason’s location in the doorway at the time of his arrest.53  The court 
concluded that based on its previous decision in Mason, the defendant’s 
arrest in Carrion was valid under the Fourth Amendment.54  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has relied on Carrion in rendering subsequent 
decisions involving similar instances of warrantless doorway arrests.55    
                                                                                                             
whether that individual came to the doorway voluntarily[]”); McKinney v. George, 726 
F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the police did not cross the threshold of 
defendant’s apartment because after the defendant opened his door to their knock, the 
police told him to come along with them and he voluntarily complied). 
51 Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128.  In Carrion, defendants Carrion and Solmor were involved in 
a drug sale with undercover DEA officers.  Id. at 1122–23.  A purchase had been arranged 
between Carrion and one of the agents, and Carrion was arrested after the transaction.  Id. 
at 1123.  After Carrion’s arrest, the agents located Solmor in a hotel room.  Id.  One of the 
agents identified himself to a hotel housekeeping employee and asked the housekeeper to 
knock on the door of Solmor’s room to see if anyone was present.  Id.  The employee 
knocked, stated he was housekeeping, and Solmor opened the door.  Id.  The agents drew 
their weapons, and ordered Solmor to raise his hands.  Id.  Solmor then surrendered to the 
police and was subsequently arrested although the DEA agents had not first obtained a 
warrant.  Id. 
52 United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981).  In Mason, the defendant 
voluntarily came to the front door of his house as law enforcement agents approached.  Id. 
at 47.  Although the agents did not have an arrest warrant, the court held that the 
defendant’s arrest at his door was valid.  Id.  Citing Santana as controlling precedent, the 
court explained that such a warrantless arrest was consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
because Mason was in a public place at the time of arrest and thus had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Id. 
53 Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128 n.9 (stressing that “[b]y declining to require any such exact 
showing [of the defendant’s exact location], the Mason Court, it seems clear, regarded 
Mason’s location at the open front door as a public place even if his feet were planted 
slightly back of the door frame[]”). 
54 Id. at 1128 (stating that based upon the reasoning of Mason, Solmor’s arrest was valid 
because he had no protected expectation of privacy while he stood in the doorway of the 
hotel room and the arrest was effected before the DEA agents actually entered the hotel 
room). 
55 See Pulliam v. City of Hornlake, Mississippi, 1994 WL 442316, at *2 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that although the defendant was only at her door as a result of a knock from the 
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b.  United States v. Vaneaton 
Similarly, in Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest, which occurred after the 
defendant voluntarily opened his door to police officers standing outside 
of his motel room, was proper under the Fourth Amendment because the 
zone of privacy sought to be protected by Payton was not implicated.56  
The court explained that the question in Vaneaton was not whether the 
defendant was actually standing inside or outside of the threshold of his 
motel room at the time of his arrest, “but whether he ‘voluntarily 
exposed himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his 
motel room to the police.”57  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that because Vaneaton opened the door after he saw the 
                                                                                                             
police, she was still in a public place and could be considered to be in a public place for 
purposes of warrantless arrest, even if she was standing slightly back from the door frame); 
United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1539 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because the 
defendant responded voluntarily to a border patrol agent’s knock on the defendant’s motel 
room door, no Fourth Amendment scrutiny was triggered regarding the subsequent 
arrest); United States v. Bustamante-Saenz, 894 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
because the police did not enter the defendant’s home in order to arrest him, but instead 
waited to arrest the defendant until he emerged from his house, his arrest did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment). 
56 United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995).  In Vaneaton, the police 
were investigating the activities of Jack Vaneaton, a burglar who had been operating in 
various counties in Oregon.  Id. at 1424.  During their investigation of Vaneaton’s 
possession of stolen property, the police learned that Vaneaton was staying in a nearby 
motel for the night.  Id. at 1425.  Armed with probable cause, the police went to Vaneaton’s 
hotel room seeking to arrest him for receiving stolen property.  Id.  The police knocked on 
Vaneaton’s door but made no demands of Vaneaton to open the door.  Id.  Vaneaton 
opened the curtains of a window, saw that the police were outside, and proceeded to open 
the doorway of his room.  Id.  As Vaneaton stood at the doorway, but was just inside the 
threshold of the room, the police advised Vaneaton that he was under arrest.  Id.  
Significantly, the police did not enter past the threshold of the doorway before advising 
Vaneaton that he was under arrest.  Id.  See also supra note 44 (explaining that in Payton, the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house 
that may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant). 
57 Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426.  The court explained that the question presented in Vaneaton 
was not based only upon whether the defendant was standing inside or outside of the 
threshold of the doorway, but rather “whether [Vaneaton had] ‘voluntarily exposed 
himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his motel room to the police.  If 
[Vaneaton had] exposed himself [in this manner], the presumption created by Payton is 
overcome.”  Id.  (citation omitted).  In formulating this principle, the Vaneaton court relied 
heavily on the reasoning of a previous, related decision.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980)).  In Johnson, the suspect’s warrantless open doorway 
arrest had been held invalid because the arresting officers had used coercive tactics and 
misrepresented their identities in order to force the suspect to open his door.  Johnson, 626 
F.2d at 757.  The Johnson court explained, “it cannot be said that Johnson voluntarily 
exposed himself to warrantless arrest by opening his door to agents who misrepresented 
their identities[]” because Johnson’s exposure was not consensual on his part.  Id. 
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police through a window, he exposed himself to warrantless arrest in a 
public place and his arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.58  
Though it was not the first case decided by the Ninth Circuit on this 
issue, the position articulated by the court in Vaneaton represents the 
general position of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on warrantless 
open doorway arrests.59 
                                                 
58 Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.  The court explained that “implicit in Johnson is [the] 
approval of the warrantless arrest of a suspect who voluntarily opens the door of his 
dwelling in response to a noncoercive knock by the police.”  Id. at 1426.  By opening the 
doorway in such a manner, Vaneaton’s arrest was valid because warrantless arrests carried 
out in public places do not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 1427.  The court went on 
and concluded that Vaneaton’s case did not resemble the types of in-home invasions or 
intrusions that Payton attempted to protect, and that “[k]nocking on a door to attempt to 
contact a person inside is a common event and hardly a hallmark of a police state[][.]”  Id. 
59 See United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that when the 
defendant opened his motel room door and came outside in response to a non-coercive 
knock by police, he surrendered his heightened expectation of privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment protections that go along with it including the right not to be detained based 
on reasonable suspicion); Honeycutt v. Gillespie, 1998 WL 391470, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the warrantless arrest of defendant, made after she opened her doorway 
without first checking who was behind the door, was reasonable because the doorway of a 
house is a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes and the defendant had thus 
voluntarily exposed herself to whoever was standing behind the door); United States v. 
Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that although the police entry into 
defendant’s motel room to perform a search violated the defendant’s privacy interest, the 
police could and should have arrested the defendant at the threshold of the doorway); 
United States v. Camacho, 1996 WL 419700, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
defendant’s warrantless arrest was permissible because by opening the door to his room, 
the defendant had exposed himself in a public area); Fredericks v. Wright, 1995 WL 23651, 
at *2 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that it is not a Fourth Amendment violation for government 
officers to knock on an individual’s door and arrest the individual when the door is 
opened, even if the individual is still standing in the doorway); United States v. Walsh, 
1993 WL 326382, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the defendant, who was standing in 
the doorway of a warehouse in plain view as police officers approached to arrest her, was 
sufficiently in a public place that her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United 
States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that individuals who 
voluntarily look over their backyard fence or gate and expose themselves to public view of 
anyone on the street cannot be said to be in an area where they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and because defendant engaged in such actions his warrantless 
arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Von Marschner, 1988 WL 
65553, at *2 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that because the police did not surround the 
defendant’s residence, confront him with weapons drawn, or order him to emerge from the 
home, but instead invited him outside after knocking on his door, the defendant’s arrest 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he could not have reasonably believed that 
he was arrested while still inside his home); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a doorway is a public place and thus no warrant was required 
when DEA agents knocked on defendant’s door and immediately arrested him when he 
opened the door); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
because the door to defendant’s apartment was opened in response to a police officer’s 
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c. McKinnon v. Carr 
Likewise, in McKinnon, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the validity of a warrantless open doorway arrest that occurred after 
police, armed with probable cause, came to the defendant’s home, 
knocked on the door and identified themselves, and the defendant 
voluntarily opened his door.60  In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals strongly relied on the principles of Santana to establish that the 
defendant McKinnon had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the 
time of his arrest.61  The court explained that although McKinnon 
attempted to rely on Payton to argue that the arrest violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy, the facts at hand made McKinnon’s case 
clearly distinguishable because McKinnon was arrested at the doorway 
of his home after voluntarily exposing himself to arresting officers (while 
the defendants in Payton were arrested beyond the threshold of the 
doorway after remaining firmly inside their homes).62 
2. Major Decisions Invalidating Warrantless Doorway Arrests 
While this Note has shown that the circuit courts have, in many 
instances, upheld warrantless doorway arrests, the circuit courts have 
also invalidated these types of arrests in certain situations.  Sparing v. 
Village of Olympia Fields63 and United States v. Morgan64 are two important 
                                                                                                             
knock and he was placed under arrest at that time, the issue of a warrantless entry into the 
apartment was not before the court). 
60 McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996).  In McKinnon, the officers had 
probable cause to arrest McKinnon based on evidence that he raped a woman.  Id.  The 
officers did not threaten McKinnon with violence and asked McKinnon to identify himself, 
which he did.  Id.  One of the officers told McKinnon that he was under arrest for rape, and 
McKinnon was then allowed to dress himself before the arrest was actually made.  Id.  The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the defendant was standing within the 
threshold of the doorway in an area open to public view, his warrantless arrest was valid 
under the Fourth Amendment because he could no longer claim a valid expectation of 
privacy at that time. 
61 Id.  The court explained that as in Santana, McKinnon “was visible, standing in the 
threshold of his doorway, open to public view.  He was in a place sufficiently public that he 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy.”  Id.  The court emphasized the fact that 
McKinnon had voluntarily opened the door and acknowledged the authority of the officers 
by asking them if he could dress before the arrest was effected.  Id. at 936.  See also supra 
note 36 (explaining that because the defendant Santana was knowingly standing in the 
doorway of her home, a public place, she was therefore not in an area in which she had any 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
62 McKinnon, 103 F.3d at 936.  The court stated that “Payton contains language that 
describes the Fourth Amendment as drawing a firm line at the entrance to one’s house, but, 
on its facts, it has no application to a doorway arrest made in the circumstances of the 
present case.”  Id. 
63 Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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cases in which the Sixth and Seventh Circuits concluded that warrantless 
doorway arrests constitute violations of the Fourth Amendment, and 
these cases are discussed in turn. 
a. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields 
In Sparing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant’s warrantless arrest was invalid because the arresting officer 
walked directly into Defendant Sparing’s home to make the arrest 
without first obtaining Sparing’s consent.65  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that the circumstances of the arrest in Sparing were 
distinguishable from both Santana66 and a previous decision rendered by 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Berkowitz.67  In 
                                                                                                             
64 United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984). 
65 Sparing, 266 F.3d at 690–91.  In Sparing, the defendant was involved in a workplace 
extortion scheme with one of his co-workers.  Id. at 685.  Sparing and his co-worker had 
filed a police report alleging that another co-worker had stolen files from the office and 
forged two checks.  Id.  After the police were alerted to the existence of the scheme, an 
officer went to Sparing’s house and knocked on his door.  Id. at 687.  Sparing opened the 
door and stood in the doorway, but was still standing behind his closed screen door when 
the officer advised Sparing that he was under arrest.  Id.  Sparing asked the officer if he had 
a warrant, and after the officer relayed that he did not, Sparing walked away from the 
doorway and further into his home.  Id.  The officer then opened the screen door, entered 
Sparing’s residence, and took several steps into the home to arrest him.  Id.  The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that because the defendant’s arrest was not 
made at the doorway or the threshold of the doorway but instead was conducted after the 
police non-consensually walked into his home after opening a closed screen door, the arrest 
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy.  Id. at 690–91. 
66 Id. at 689.  The court explained that a Santana-type analysis would apply in situations 
where “the individual is not voluntarily standing in an open doorway, but answers a knock 
at the door, standing by a ‘fraction of an inch’ behind an open doorway[][.]”  Id.  Although 
Sparing had answered a knock at his doorway, he was still behind a closed screen door at 
the time of his arrest.  Id. at 689–90.  This vital fact led the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
to determine that that a Santana analysis would not apply in Sparing’s case.  Id. 
67 United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991).  In Berkowitz, the defendant, 
for whom probable cause existed to make an arrest, was told that he was under arrest as 
soon as he opened the door to the police.  Id. at 1380.  The defendant then acquiesced to the 
authority of the officers, and the officers entered his home to complete the arrest.  Id.  The 
court held that when a person submits to an arrest at his doorway, he “has forfeited the 
privacy of his home to a certain extent.”  Id. at 1387.  The court explained that “[a] person 
who has submitted to the police’s authority and stands waiting for the police to take him 
away can hardly complain when the police enter his home briefly to complete the arrest.”  
Id.  The Sparing court noted that in accordance with Berkowitz, “when an individual 
voluntarily stands behind an open doorway—fractions of an inch ‘inside the home’—
ordinarily, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, she stands outside, in a public place.”  
Sparing, 266 F.3d at 689.  However, the Sparing court then clarified that its ultimate holding 
in Berkowitz was as follows: 
[I]f the police go to an individual’s home without a warrant, knock on 
the door, announce from  outside the home that the individual is 
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declining to uphold Sparing’s arrest, the court reasoned that the facts of 
the case put the decision beyond the scope of Santana, Berkowitz, and 
Watson.68  The court explained that because Sparing was standing behind 
a closed screen door at his doorway, he was not yet in a public place and 
thus did not “surrender [any] reasonable expectations of privacy in [his] 
home[.]”69  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated in 
Sparing, the circuit courts are reluctant to uphold the validity of 
warrantless doorway arrests in situations where police make an explicit 
entry past the threshold of the doorway and walk into the private 
confines of a home to carry out an arrest.70  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                             
under arrest when she opens the door to answer, and the individual 
acquiesces to a slight entry to complete the arrest, [then] the entry is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and consistent with Payton. 
Id. at 690 (footnote omitted). 
68 Id. at 689.  The most critical fact here, according to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, was that Sparing’s arrest was not conducted at the doorway or even at the 
threshold of the doorway; Sparing stood inside his home behind his closed screen door, 
and the officer opened this door and walked into Sparing’s home in order to arrest him.  Id. 
at 690–91.  Therefore, Sparing was not in a public place as the defendant in Watson was, 
was not voluntarily within an open doorway as in Santana, and was not answering a knock 
at the door while standing fractions of an inch behind an open doorway as the defendant in 
Berkowitz was.  Id. at 690.  Because Sparing clearly stood behind his screen door and 
remained inside his home, he did not surrender any reasonable expectation of privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
69 Id. at 690.  The court reasoned that unlike the situation in Santana, Sparing “was not 
exposed to ‘public view, speech, hearing, and touch’ as if he were standing outside, in a 
public place (voluntarily or otherwise).”  Id.  Therefore, because the police had not obtained 
a warrant for Sparing’s arrest, the Court decided to apply the principles of Payton and held 
that Sparing had not surrendered any reasonable expectation or privacy because he had 
remained within his home.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded by 
indicating that Sparing’s arrest could have been legally performed only if Sparing had 
“opened his screen door, and [either] stepped [slightly] outside of his home or acquiesced 
to a slight entry to complete the arrest.”  Id. 
70 See United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
although the defendant put his arm and hand outside his house by extending them 
through a panel opening after the police knocked on his door, the rest of his body did not 
cross the threshold of the doorway and his doorway was not open to public view; thus the 
officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering through the doorway and into 
the defendant’s living room to effectuate the arrest); Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1286 
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that because the defendant was attempting to limit his exposure to 
police officers by closing an open door and defendant was at least a door’s width inside his 
house when he attempted to close the door, the police violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights by pushing the door open and taking two steps into the house to arrest the 
defendant); United States v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the 
defendant’s arrest, which occurred after the police crossed the threshold of and walked 
directly into his open garage, violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
because the garage is considered to be a private area of the home); LaLonde v. County of 
Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because defendant’s arrest 
occurred after the police crossed the threshold of the doorway and walked into the 
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Appeals rendered a similar decision in United States v. Morgan, which is 
discussed next. 
b. United States v. Morgan 
In Morgan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant’s warrantless arrest at the doorway of his home violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights because the police officers employed coercive 
tactics which essentially forced the defendant to emerge from his home.71  
Relying partly on the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Johnson,72 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
that Morgan did not voluntarily expose himself to a warrantless arrest 
by appearing at the doorway.73  The court reasoned that although there 
had not been a direct entry into Morgan’s home by police prior to the 
                                                                                                             
defendant’s apartment, the case did not fall under the doorway exception and was a 
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); Garrison v. City of 
Cushing, 1993 WL 332284, at *3 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that because the defendant was 
standing four to five feet within his house behind a closed screen door, he was not in a 
public realm and therefore the subsequent police entry into the home to arrest the 
defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 
809–10 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because DEA agents entered a private warehouse, 
climbed a flight of stairs to an office area, and opened a private office without knocking, 
the subsequent warrantless arrest of the defendant while she stood inside the office area 
violated her Fourth Amendment right to privacy). 
71 United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984).  In Morgan, the police 
received a complaint that the defendant Morgan and several others had been target 
shooting with automatic weapons inside of a public park.  Id. at 1160.  An officer responded 
to the complaint and advised the group of men to leave the park.  Id.  After Morgan and the 
others left in Morgan’s car, an unidentified observer approached the officer and alerted 
him to the fact that the men were armed with automatic weapons and should be 
considered dangerous.  Id.  A group of officers located Morgan’s car and followed it to the 
home of his mother.  Id.  At this point, a squad of police officers surrounded the Morgan 
home.  Id. at 1161.  The officers then flooded the house with spotlights and summoned 
Morgan from the home with the blaring call of a bullhorn.  Id.  Morgan came to the front 
door of the home with a pistol in his hand, and was subsequently arrested after the police 
ordered him to put down the gun and come outside.  Id. 
72 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980).  In Johnson, the suspect’s warrantless open doorway arrest 
was held invalid because the arresting officers used coercive tactics and misrepresented 
their identities in order to force the suspect to open his door.  Id. at 757.  The Johnson court 
explained that it could not be said that Johnson “voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless 
arrest by opening his door to agents who misrepresented their identities[]” because 
Johnson’s exposure was not consensual on his part.  Id. 
73 Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166.  The court explained that it was an undisputed fact that 
“Morgan was peacefully residing in his mother’s home until he was aroused by the police 
activities occurring outside.”  Id.  The court emphasized that Morgan came to the doorway 
“only because of the coercive police behavior taking place outside of the house.”  Id.  
Therefore, the important consideration in this case was the “location of the arrested person, 
and not the arresting agent[]” in determining whether the arrest occurred within the 
privacy of the home.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/9
2009] Open Doorway Arrests 833 
arrest, the coercive tactics used by police resulted in a “constructive 
entry [which] accomplished the same thing[][.]”74  Therefore, the court 
concluded that upholding Morgan’s arrest would undermine the 
protections emphasized in Payton.75  As the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals indicated in Morgan, the circuit courts are reluctant to uphold 
warrantless doorway arrests in situations where police use coercive 
tactics to either gain entry to a home or force a defendant to come to the 
doorway, because in those situations a defendant’s exposure at the 
doorway is not voluntary.76  With the aforementioned principles in 
mind, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish v. 
Nugent will now be discussed. 
                                                 
74 Id.  The court explained that the coercive tactics used by the police to force Morgan 
out of the home rose to the level of what could be considered an actual entry into the 
privacy of the home to conduct the arrest.  Id.  In a subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals clarified that a ‘“constructive entry’ [was] when the police, while not 
entering the house, deploy overbearing tactics that essentially force the individual out of 
the home.”  United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2005).  The Thomas court 
also explained that “coercive police conduct [refers to] ‘such a show of authority that [the] 
Defendant reasonably believe[s] he ha[s] no choice but to comply[]” with the requests of 
police.  Id.  (citing United States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
75 Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166.  The court explained that the warrantless arrest of Morgan, 
who stood in the doorway of a private home not out of his own free will but instead in 
response to coercive police conduct, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment 
has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house that may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances). 
76 See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
although the defendant eventually emerged from his apartment after the police turned off 
the electrical power to his residence, set off a flash-bang device, threw tear gas into his 
apartment, and set off a bullhorn to summon him, he had clearly succumbed to police 
coercion in doing so and his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment); Hadley v. 
Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that because police used fraud and 
coercive tactics in order to gain entry into the home to arrest the defendant, such an arrest 
left the issue of whether the defendant actually consented to the entry to be determined by 
the trier of fact); Saari, 272 F.3d at 809 (holding that because the officers summoned the 
defendant from the home with their weapons drawn and pointed at him after knocking on 
the door, they “acted with such a show of authority that [the] Defendant reasonably 
believed he had no choice but to comply[]”; therefore, the warrantless arrest violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights) (footnote omitted); United States v. Al-Azzawy, 
784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because the defendant was inside his trailer 
at the time he was surrounded by armed officers and because the defendant did not 
voluntarily expose himself to their view outside his trailer, the fact that he emerged under 
circumstances of extreme coercion amounted to a constructive entry and violated 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); see also Tracy Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from 
the Backseat of a Police Squad Car, 70 BOSTON U. L. REV. 543, 578 at n.117 (1990) (arguing that 
“[c]oercive police behavior outside a home which results in the removal or arrest of a 
legitimate occupant violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment just as actual entry to accomplish 
the same result does[]”). 
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C. McClish v. Nugent and the Circuit Split on Warrantless Open Doorway 
Arrests 
In McClish, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant’s warrantless open doorway arrest was a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment right of privacy and was contrary to the principles 
established in Payton.77  In support of its decision, the court relied heavily 
on the actual location of the defendant at the time of arrest, finding that 
McClish remained firmly inside his trailer home at the time of arrest 
despite the fact that he stood near the doorway.78  The court gave no 
weight to the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the door to the police 
officers before the arrest was made.79  Indeed, the court declined to apply 
a Santana analysis80 to the facts of the case and instead held that 
                                                 
77 McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007).  In McClish, the police 
received complaints that defendant McClish had been harassing his neighbors in a trailer 
park.  Id. at 1233.  Upon investigating the incident and observing McClish’s behavior, the 
responding officer concluded that he had probable cause to arrest McClish for aggravated 
stalking.  Id. at 1234.  A group of police officers returned to the trailer park that night and 
sought to effectuate a warrantless arrest on McClish.  Id. at 1235.  The officers drove 
through an electronic gate in front of McClish’s trailer and proceeded to the front door of 
the home.  Id.  The officers knocked on the door and McClish went to the door and 
voluntarily opened it.  Id. at 1235–36.  Then, one of the officers reached into the house 
through the open door, grabbed McClish as he stood near the doorway, and pulled him out 
onto the trailer’s porch to carry out the arrest.  Id.  See also supra note 44 (explaining that the 
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house that may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant). 
78 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1245 (stressing that because McClish lived in a trailer, which does 
not have all of the amenities of a larger house such as a “definable chamber between the 
outer door and the interior of the dwelling[,]” McClish was already firmly planted within 
the privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the officers and stood 
behind the door); see also United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that because the defendant lived in a trailer so small that he was able to open his 
door to police while remaining in his bed, the defendant was not in a public place and did 
not abandon his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
79 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247.  The court explained that while “[i]t is surely true that an 
individual who opens the door to his home may provide an officer with a basis for finding 
probable cause[;] . . . this is quite distinct from creating, all in itself, a right of entry to seize a 
person from his home without a warrant.”  Id.  The court emphasized that “McClish did 
not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when he 
opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within his home from a 
warrantless arrest.”  Id. (citing United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that “a person does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the 
officers’ entry by [partially opening the door to determine the identity of officers knocking 
on the door], and that his arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment”)). 
80 See supra note 36 (explaining that in Santana, because the defendant was knowingly 
standing in the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an 
area in which she could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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McClish’s arrest involved a warrantless intrusion into the home that was 
held unconstitutional in Payton.81 
Judge Anderson filed a special concurring opinion in McClish in 
which he agreed with the majority in aspects of the case not relevant to 
the scope of this Note, but strongly dissented from the majority’s holding 
that McClish’s arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.82  Judge 
Anderson argued that Santana, rather than Payton, should have been 
applied as controlling precedent because Payton was not decided as a 
doorway arrest case.83  In addition, Judge Anderson reasoned that by 
choosing to apply the dicta in Payton84 rather than the holding of 
Santana,85 the majority opinion was, in essence, arguing that Payton 
overruled Santana.86  Judge Anderson argued that this fact alone was 
enough to reject the majority’s reasoning in McClish.87 
                                                 
81 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247–48.  The court explained that because “warrantless 
intrusions beyond the ‘zone of privacy’ delimited by the threshold are presumptively 
unreasonable[,]” the fact that the arresting officer “reached across the threshold of the 
home and grabbed McClish without warning[]” is what caused the arrest to violate 
McClish’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 1247–48 & n.16; see supra note 44 (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house and absent 
exigent circumstances, the threshold of the doorway may not reasonably be crossed to 
make an arrest unless a warrant has first been obtained). 
82 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1253. 
83 Id. at 1253–54.  The concurring opinion reasoned that McClish’s case was “legally 
indistinguishable from Santana[]” based on the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the 
door in response to a knock by police, and thus “[k]nowingly expose[d] both himself and 
the immediate area behind his threshold to public view.”  Id.  Therefore, McClish could no 
longer claim an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment once he opened his 
door, and the police needed only probable cause rather than a warrant to arrest him.  Id. at 
1254.  The concurrence then explained that Payton, as applied here by the majority, “was 
not a doorway arrest case[]” but rather had decided the narrow issue of “simply ‘whether 
and under what circumstances an officer may enter [into the interior of] a suspect’s home 
to make a warrantless arrest.’”  Id. 
84 Id. at 1255 (explaining that in Payton, the Court said nothing about the 
constitutionality of arrests occurring at an open doorway and did not determine any type 
of rule to apply in such scenarios; the Payton decision simply used the term threshold to 
generally refer to the entrance to the home). 
85 See supra note 33 (upholding Santana’s warrantless arrest because she had knowingly 
exposed herself to police officers in the doorway of her home—which is a public place). 
86 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1255–56.  The concurrence explained that such a conclusion 
would be unwarranted because the Court “does not overrule precedents sub silentio[]” and 
in the Payton decision itself, “the Court actually cited Santana, without overruling or even 
questioning it[]” in a string cite of public arrest cases.  Id. at 1256. 
87 Id. at 1256 n.5 (explaining that because the Court in Santana said that arrests on the 
threshold without a warrant are legal and “common sense tells us that an officer 
conducting an arrest at the literal threshold would necessarily cross the plane of the door in 
a great many threshold arrests[,]” the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with Santana’s 
holding). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Although the circuit courts have upheld warrantless doorway arrests 
under certain circumstances and invalidated them in others, these 
decisions, aside from McClish, are ultimately consistent with existing 
Supreme Court precedent.88  Part III.A analyzes decisions by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals in which warrantless doorway arrests have been 
upheld, explains the factors that these courts have found to be important 
in analyzing the validity of open doorway arrests, and argues that these 
decisions are consistent with Supreme Court precedent established by 
Santana, Payton, and earlier cases.89  Then, Part III.B analyzes decisions by 
Circuit Courts of Appeals in which warrantless doorway arrests have 
been invalidated and argues that these cases also represent a consistent 
application of either Santana or Payton as dictated by the circumstances 
of the particular case.90  Finally, Part III.C analyzes the decision of the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish and argues that it was not 
only incorrect, but that it abandoned existing precedent on the issue of 
warrantless doorway arrests and was based upon flawed reasoning by 
the majority.91 
A. Key Factors of Decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals Upholding 
Warrantless Doorway Arrests 
In upholding warrantless doorway arrests, the circuit courts have 
emphasized two important points:  (1) warrantless arrests can be 
lawfully conducted at the threshold of the doorway because it is a public 
place, and (2) once an individual opens the doorway of his home, that 
individual surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.92  The key aspect of all these judicial decisions is 
that those circuit courts which have upheld the validity of warrantless 
open doorway arrests have been able to properly distinguish the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Santana from its holding in Payton.93 
                                                 
88 See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (examining decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals involving 
warrantless doorway arrests). 
89 See infra Part III.A. 
90 See infra Part III.B; see also supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle); supra note 
44 (discussing the Payton principle). 
91 See infra Part III.C. 
92 See infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
93 See supra note 36 (holding that because the defendant Santana was knowingly 
standing in the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an 
area in which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment); supra note 44 (holding that the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at 
the entrance of the home which cannot reasonably be crossed without a warrant if exigent 
circumstances do not exist). 
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1. The Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply to Arrests Made at the 
Doorway’s Threshold 
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Santana, which has 
never been overruled, the doorway of a home is considered to be a 
public place.94  Although Payton stands for the principle that the Fourth 
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the home that may not 
be crossed absent a warrant or other exigent circumstances, the circuit 
courts have determined that arrests conducted at the doorway do not 
violate Payton.95  In such cases, police or other law enforcement officers 
do not cross the threshold of the doorway and make an actual entry into 
the privacy of the home to make the arrest; rather, the arrests are 
conducted after the defendants expose themselves to police officers by 
standing in the public area of the doorway.96 
                                                 
94 See supra note 36 (explaining that a doorway is a public place and that by exposing 
herself in such an area, the defendant Santana could lawfully be subjected to warrantless 
arrest).  See also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 97 (2007) (noting that the doorway of the home is 
considered to be a public place for purposes of warrantless arrest). 
95 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  For a discussion of cases in which 
warrantless doorway arrests have been upheld as valid, see supra notes 55 and 59 and 
accompanying text.  See also United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that courts have generally upheld arrests “where the police go to a person’s 
home without a warrant, knock on the door, announce from outside the home the person is 
under arrest when he opens the door to answer, and the person acquiesces to the arrest[]”). 
96 See Honeycutt v. Gillespie, 1998 WL 391470, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the 
defendant was arrested in the doorway of her home which is a public place); United States 
v. Camacho, 1996 WL 419700, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the defendant opened 
the doorway of his hotel room to police officers and was subsequently arrested after doing 
so); United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that as the 
defendant Vaneaton stood at the doorway, the police advised Vaneaton that he was under 
arrest and did not enter past the threshold of the doorway before fully effecting the arrest); 
Fredericks v. Wright, 1995 WL 23651, at *2 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that according to 
statements made by the defendant, the arresting officer did not step into the home to arrest 
the defendant but rather informed the defendant that he was under arrest and asked the 
defendant to step outside); Pulliam v. City of Hornlake, Mississippi, 1994 WL 442316, at *2 
(5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the defendant had placed herself at the doorway in response 
to the officers knock, and therefore was arrested in a public place); United States v. Walsh, 
1993 WL 326382, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the defendant was standing in the 
doorway of a warehouse in plain view as the officers approached to arrest him); United 
States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that as the defendant 
opened the door, the police drew their weapons, ordered the defendant to raise his hands, 
and placed him under arrest); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that as the defendant answered the door, he was immediately placed under 
arrest and handcuffed); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating 
that the door was opened by the defendant in response to an officer’s knock, and the 
defendant was placed under arrest at the time; the officers were therefore not required to 
enter the apartment to place the defendant under arrest). 
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When an individual stands or exposes himself or herself within the 
doorway, he or she is no longer located within the privacy of the home 
and can, consistent with precedent set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Santana, be subjected to a valid warrantless arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment.97  Significantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Payton has absolutely no application in these circumstances; when an 
arrest occurs at the doorway, the issue of a warrantless entry into the 
home does not actually arise.98 
The issue surrounding warrantless doorway arrests is more aptly 
based upon forming a precise definition of what constitutes the 
threshold of the doorway.  No Court of Appeals has set forth such a 
definition, nor has any decision by the Court of Appeals precisely 
defined the exact location in which a defendant must be standing at the 
time of the warrantless arrest for the arrest to be valid.99  Because of this 
ambiguity, law enforcement officers are faced with difficult choices that 
are further complicated by the McClish decision when they attempt to 
make a warrantless arrest.100  However, as discussed in Part II.A.2, the 
circuit courts have identified another factor—the defendant’s voluntary 
exposure to arresting officers—which allows for a more determinative 
method of analysis through Fourth Amendment principles.101 
                                                 
97 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  See also United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that a person who opens the door to a dwelling in response to a 
knock by an invitee opens to view whatever can be seen by a nosy neighbor or an 
observant police officer and such a person exhibits no actual expectation of privacy after 
doing so); LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258 (noting that “[p]ermitting the police to make a 
warrantless arrest of a person who answers the door . . . makes great sense simply because 
it can be expected that in the vast majority of such confrontations the person will submit to 
the police[]”). 
98 See supra note 41 (explaining that a warrantless arrest made within the privacy of the 
home constitutes an unlawful invasion of an individual’s right to privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment).  See also Gori, 230 F.3d at 51 (explaining that Payton does not hold or suggest 
that the home is a sanctuary from reasonable police investigation; rather, Payton protects an 
individual’s privacy interest, even within the home, only in terms of what the individual 
has not knowingly exposed to public view) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S 38, 42 
(1976)). 
99 See supra Part II.B. 
100 McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a warrantless 
open doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into the private confines of the home which 
violates the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton). 
101 See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the circuit courts have held that once an 
individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual surrenders his reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
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2. An Individual Surrenders His Reasonable Expectation of Privacy by 
Voluntarily Opening the Door of the Home 
In analyzing an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment, it is important to keep in mind that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people rather than places.102  Furthermore, in the 
context of warrantless doorway arrests, the protections offered by the 
Fourth Amendment do not apply to what an individual knowingly 
exposes to the public.103  The circuit courts, in addition to relying on 
Santana’s holding that a doorway is a public place, have emphasized that 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is an important factor 
that must be evaluated in determining the validity of a warrantless 
doorway arrest.104 
For example, in Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
specifically stated that the main issue in the case was not whether the 
defendant was standing inside or outside the threshold of the doorway 
at the time of arrest, but whether the defendant “had voluntary exposed 
himself to warrantless arrest by freely opening the door of his motel 
room to police.”105  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals based 
its decision to uphold the defendant’s warrantless arrest in McKinnon on 
the fact that the defendant, by voluntarily opening the door of his home 
to police and standing at the doorway, “had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy.”106  In United States v. Gori, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest in similar 
circumstances and even went so far as to suggest that “[n]o one in a 
place open[] to public view can expect privacy in that place and at that 
time, whether [he] is on the threshold [of the doorway], in a vestibule [of 
the home,] or at the far end of an exposed interior room.”107   
                                                 
102 See supra note 24 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places). 
103 See supra note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection[]”). 
104 See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text (discussing principles supporting the 
validity of warrantless doorway arrests in Vaneaton, McKinnon, and Gori); see also supra note 
36 (explaining the Santana principle). 
105 See supra note 57 (explaining that if the defendant Vaneaton had voluntarily exposed 
himself to the police by opening the door of his motel room, the presumption of Payton 
would be overcome). 
106 McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996).  The court explained that based 
on Santana, McKinnon’s warrantless doorway arrest was valid under the Fourth 
Amendment because he had voluntarily opened the door and exposed himself to public 
view.  Id. 
107 United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000).  The court also noted that once an 
individual voluntarily opens the door of his home to whoever is standing outside, that 
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The circuit courts have continually placed less emphasis on the 
precise location of the defendant in the doorway during the course of 
arrest and have instead relied more heavily on the individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the arrest.108  This 
analysis of doorway arrests correctly implicates the right of privacy that 
the Fourth Amendment protects, namely that of the individual 
himself.109  Therefore, by remaining within his home and not answering 
the door, an individual in this type of situation fully retains his 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment because 
the principles of Santana and Payton have not yet been implicated.110 
Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, it 
is not until an individual decides to open the doorway of the home to 
police, and expose himself to public view, that the Fourth Amendment is 
relevant to the analysis.111  At this point the individual has knowingly 
abrogated his reasonable expectation of privacy and can be subjected to a 
lawful warrantless arrest.112  It is important to note that the individuals 
arrested in these types of situations are not merely individuals who 
simply come to the doorway and open the door to police standing 
outside; the principles governing warrantless doorway arrests apply 
                                                                                                             
individual “exhibit[s] no actual expectation of privacy and therefore lose[s] the heightened 
constitutional protection that might flow from such an expectation.”  Id. 
108 See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (arguing that an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy is the determinative factor that must be analyzed in a warrantless doorway 
arrest case); see also supra note 55 (explaining that because the defendant in Pulliam 
voluntarily opened the doorway to police, his arrest would have been valid even if his feet 
were planted slightly back from the door frame); supra note 50 (explaining that the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Duncan that the crucial issue in warrantless doorway 
arrest cases “involve[s] the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and whether that 
individual came to the doorway voluntarily[]”); supra note 67 (noting that in Berkowitz, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that an individual who voluntarily opens the door 
and stands there waiting for the police to arrest him cannot complain if the police briefly 
enter the home to complete the arrest). 
109 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that the protections 
offered by the Fourth Amendment have been held to apply to people rather than places); 
Lewis, supra note 24 (arguing that the protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment is aimed at the protection of the individual rather than the home). 
110 See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle); supra note 44 (explaining the 
Payton principle). 
111 See supra note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection[]”). 
112 See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle); see also LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 
384 (arguing that the home is generally held to be an area in which an individual can 
maintain an expectation of “privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to 
the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to 
himself has been exhibited[]”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/9
2009] Open Doorway Arrests 841 
only to individuals for whom probable cause exists to make a felony 
arrest.113 
B. Consistent Application of the Principles of Santana and Payton 
The circuit courts decline to uphold warrantless doorway arrests in 
two types of situations.  The first situation occurs when police or other 
law enforcement officers make an actual, explicit entry past the threshold 
of the doorway and walk into the home to make the arrest.114  The 
second situation occurs when police or other law enforcement officers 
make a constructive entry into the home or employ coercive tactics to 
force an individual to come to the doorway of the home for purposes of 
arrest.115  Cases involving actual police entry into the home or coercive 
police tactics designed to force an individual to the doorway simply 
cannot stand under the rules set forth in both Santana and Payton because 
these situations constitute violations of the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.116 
1. Rejecting the Validity of Doorway Arrests That Involve Actual Entry 
into the Home Is Consistent With Payton 
Payton stands for the principle that a warrantless entry past the 
threshold of the doorway and into the privacy of the home to make an 
arrest is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.117  Although the circuit 
courts have sometimes declined to uphold what at first glance might 
seem like a warrantless doorway arrest, a closer examination of the facts 
of such cases shows these arrests merely implicated the doorway; in 
these situations, the arrests were actually conducted within the privacy 
of the home and were properly invalidated consistent with Payton.118 
                                                 
113 See supra note 29 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests 
in public places where a police officer has probable cause to believe a felony has occurred). 
114 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a (surveying cases in which warrantless doorway 
arrests were held to violate the Fourth Amendment because the police clearly entered past 
the threshold of the doorway and into the home to conduct the arrest). 
115 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b (surveying cases in which warrantless doorway 
arrests were held to violate the Fourth Amendment because police employed coercive 
tactics which forced the defendants to expose themselves in the threshold of the doorway 
for purposes of arrest); see also United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(defining a constructive entry as a situation where police, while not entering the home, 
deploy overbearing tactics that essentially force an individual out of the home in violation 
of the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
116 See infra Parts III.B.1–2. 
117 See supra note 44 (explaining the Payton principle). 
118 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
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For example, in Sparing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
invalidated the defendant’s arrest because although the arrest involved 
the doorway, it had not actually been conducted at the doorway or even 
at the threshold of the doorway.119  Instead, while the defendant stood 
inside his home behind a fully closed screen door, an officer opened this 
door and walked directly into the home in order to arrest the 
defendant.120  Similarly, in LaLonde v. County of Riverside, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that because police walked through the 
threshold of the doorway and into the defendant’s apartment in order to 
make the arrest, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy 
was violated.121  In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined 
to uphold the defendant’s warrantless arrest in Garrison v. City of Cushing 
because the defendant was standing four to five feet within his house 
behind a closed screen door, and the police entered well beyond the 
threshold of the doorway to carry out the arrest.122 
These cases did not involve open doorway arrests; rather, they 
involved law enforcement officers actually entering into the private 
confines of an individual’s home absent consent—something that is 
clearly forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.123  The circuit courts that 
have addressed “actual entry” cases note the existence of a common but 
vital principle that is crucial to the analysis of open doorway arrests:  the 
zone of privacy that Payton sought to protect lies beyond the threshold of 
                                                 
119 Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
because the defendant’s arrest was not made at the doorway or the threshold of the 
doorway but instead was conducted after the police non-consensually walked into his 
home, the arrest violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); see also 
supra note 65 (discussing Sparing). 
120 Id. at 690–91 (explaining that Defendant Sparing stood inside his home behind a fully 
closed screen door, and the arresting officer opened the door and walked directly into 
Sparing’s home in order to arrest him).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
here, because Sparing stood behind his closed screen door and thus did not surrender any 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the arresting officer violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights by opening the screen door and walking into the home to arrest Sparing.  Id. at 690. 
121 See supra note 70 (holding that because the defendant’s arrest in LaLonde occurred after 
the police crossed the threshold of the doorway and walked into the defendant’s 
apartment, the case did not fall under the doorway exception and was a violation of the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy). 
122 See supra note 70 (holding that because the defendant in Garrison was standing four to 
five feet within his house behind a closed screen door, he was not in a public area; 
therefore, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the subsequent police entry into 
his home for purposes of arrest). 
123 See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting that the circuit courts have invalidated warrantless 
doorway arrests that occurred after arresting officers walked into the home to make the 
arrest, because each defendant, by remaining within the confines of his home, did not 
surrender his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/9
2009] Open Doorway Arrests 843 
the doorway and can seemingly only be breached when an arresting 
officer places his entire person within the home to make the arrest.124 
2. Rejecting the Validity of Doorway Arrests Involving Coercive Police 
Tactics Is Consistent With Santana 
The Santana decision clearly states that the threshold of the doorway 
is a public place, and an individual who knowingly exposes himself to 
public view in such an area may be subjected to warrantless arrest.125  
Although circuit courts have invalidated warrantless arrests made while 
the defendant was standing in the threshold of the doorway, decisions in 
these types of cases have been based upon a finding that the defendant’s 
exposure to the public was not truly voluntary.126 
For example, in Morgan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
invalidated the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest because the 
defendant came to the doorway “only because of the coercive police 
behavior taking place outside of the house.”127  Similarly, in United States 
v. Saari, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again invalidated the 
defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest, holding that the coercive 
activities of police officers outside of the defendant’s home amounted to 
a constructive entry and in-home arrest.128  Finally, in Fisher v. City of San 
Jose, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to uphold the 
defendant’s warrantless arrest because the defendant was subjected to 
                                                 
124 See supra note 70 (surveying various circuit court decisions in which the defendants’ 
warrantless arrests were invalidated due to actual entries into the home by arresting 
officers).  If these decisions are examined carefully, each defendant’s warrantless arrest was 
invalidated because the arresting officer physically placed his entire person past the 
threshold of the doorway and within the home or residence to make the arrest.  See, e.g., 
Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1286 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding the defendant’s warrantless 
arrest invalid because the police pushed the defendant’s door open and took two steps into 
the house to arrest the defendant). 
125 See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle). 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 127–29 (citing cases in which the circuit courts have 
invalidated warrantless doorway arrests because the coercive tactics employed by arresting 
officers forced the defendant to expose himself at the doorway of the home). 
127 See supra note 74 (holding that the coercive tactics employed by the police in Morgan to 
force the defendant out of the home, involving the use of floodlights and a bullhorn, 
amounted to a “constructive entry” because the defendant’s exposure to the officers was 
involuntary). 
128 See supra note 76 (holding that because the officers in Saari summoned the defendant 
from his home with their weapons drawn and pointed at him after knocking on the door, 
they “acted with such a show of authority that [the] Defendant reasonably believed he had 
no choice but to comply[]”; therefore, the defendant’s warrantless arrest violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
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police coercion while still inside his home and emerged at the doorway 
only because of the tactics employed by the police.129 
Although the defendants in each of these cases came to the doorway 
after police announced their presence at the home, the arrests were 
correctly deemed invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the 
exposure to public view by the defendants was not voluntary.130  Instead, 
the coercion employed by police officers made each defendant believe he 
had no choice but to surrender to the officers by appearing at the 
threshold of the doorway or actually emerging from the home.131  
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Santana, these types of 
warrantless arrests were properly invalidated.  Specifically, in cases 
involving police coercion, the defendant has not voluntarily exposed 
himself to public view and therefore maintains a reasonable expectation 
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.132 
3. Different Facts Surrounding an Arrest Does Not Mean a New 
Standard Has Been Created 
This Note argues that the circuit courts have found that Santana and 
Payton are able to co-exist because they apply to entirely different types 
of arrests.133  Additionally, although this Note urges that a circuit split on 
the issue of warrantless doorway arrests did not truly exist until the 
                                                 
129 See supra note 76 (holding that although the defendant in Fisher eventually emerged 
from his apartment after the police turned off the electrical power to his residence, set off a 
“‘flash-bang’” device, threw CS gas into his apartment, and set off a bullhorn to summon 
him, he had clearly succumbed to the police coercion in doing so and his warrantless arrest 
violated the Fourth Amendment). 
130 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text; see also LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 260 
(explaining that if the defendant’s warrantless arrest at the door was brought about by 
coercive tactics employed by arresting officers, “then the warrantless arrest there is quite 
properly characterized as illegal[]”). 
131 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1984). (explaining that 
the officers had flooded the defendant’s house with spotlights and summoned the 
defendant Morgan from the home with the blaring call of a bullhorn); Saari, 272 F.2d at 
806–07 (explaining that the arresting officers surrounded the doorway of the defendant’s 
apartment with their weapons drawn and ordered him to emerge); Fisher v. City of San 
Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the arresting officers turned off 
the power to the defendant’s apartment, set off a “‘flash-bang’” device, threw CS gas into 
his apartment, and set off a bullhorn in an attempt to force the defendant to emerge from 
his apartment). 
132 See supra note 33 (holding that Defendant Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid 
under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant knowingly exposed herself to police 
officers in the doorway of her home, which is a public place); see also supra note 35 
(explaining that the Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection[]”). 
133 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
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McClish decision, other authors have contended that the circuit courts 
have applied Payton differently in certain situations and that two major 
views have emerged regarding warrantless doorway arrests.134  Both of 
these arguments, however, fail to recognize that:  (1) Payton does not 
truly apply to the doorway arrest scenario, and (2) circuit court decisions 
in which warrantless arrests have been invalidated involved the 
existence of either non-consensual entries into the home or coercive 
police tactics surrounding the arrest.135 
The suggestion that the circuit courts have interpreted the 
requirements of Payton differently is flawed and based only on a 
confused interpretation of judicial decisions involving warrantless 
doorway arrests.136  Payton has no implication whatsoever in the 
doorway arrest scenario; Payton merely held that arrests carried out 
within the home, absent consent or acquiescence to the authority of the 
arresting officers, violate the Fourth Amendment.137  Ultimately, if the 
circuit court decisions are read carefully, the cases in which Payton has 
been applied to invalidate warrantless arrests have involved factual 
distinctions that put the cases beyond the simple doorway arrest 
scenario resolved by Santana because actual entries into the privacy of 
the home were made.138  The simple fact that certain decisions have 
invalidated arrests due to actual entries into the home and certain 
decisions have upheld arrests due to the voluntary exposure of the 
defendant at the threshold of the doorway does not implicate a circuit 
split, and it is incorrect to suggest that such a circuit split occurred before 
the McClish decision.139 
                                                 
134 Marino, supra note 11, at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have interpreted and 
applied the requirements of Payton differently which has led to a circuit split on the issue of 
warrantless open doorway arrests); Citron, supra note 11, at 2786 (contending that two 
conflicting views have been adopted by the circuits in an attempt to resolve the dispute 
over the constitutionality of warrantless open doorway arrests). 
135 See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that the circuit courts have consistently applied Payton 
to invalidate warrantless arrests that implicated the doorway of the home but involved 
actual, non-consensual entry into the home to make the arrests); supra Part III.B.2 (arguing 
that the circuit courts have consistently applied Santana to invalidate warrantless arrests in 
which the defendant exposed himself in the threshold of the doorway, but such exposure 
was not voluntary on the part of the defendant). 
136 Marino, supra note 11, at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have interpreted the 
requirements of Payton differently leading to a circuit split on the issue of warrantless open 
doorway arrests). 
137 See supra note 44 (explaining the Payton principle). 
138 See supra note 70 for cases in which the circuits have invalidated warrantless arrests 
because they occurred after the arresting officers made a non-consensual entry into the 
home.  See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle). 
139 See supra Part III.B (arguing that Payton has been consistently applied by the circuit 
courts to invalidate warrantless arrests involving non-consensual entry into the privacy of 
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Next, case law does not adequately support the suggestion that the 
circuits are in dispute over arrests conducted at the threshold of the 
doorway.140  While the circuits have adopted two different views to 
resolve such cases involving arrests conducted at the threshold of the 
doorway, each view is merely, at its core, a proper application of either 
Payton or Santana as the facts and circumstances of each case dictate.141  
No disagreement actually exists among the circuits because Santana and 
Payton apply to entirely different scenarios of warrantless arrest and 
their principles are not at odds. 
Santana is the sole Supreme Court decision that governs doorway 
arrests and is applied to uphold such an arrest only if the defendant’s 
exposure to police is voluntary and the arrest occurs in the threshold of 
the doorway.142  Payton has no bearing upon the doorway arrest scenario 
and operates to invalidate a warrantless arrest that takes place when 
arresting officers make a full entry beyond the threshold of the doorway 
and into the privacy of the home absent consent or other exigent 
circumstances.143  The confusion on this issue stems from the fact that in 
any “actual entry” scenario of warrantless arrest governed by Payton 
(where the arrest occurs inside the home), the doorway is necessarily 
implicated in the course of the arrest, even when the arrest takes place well 
beyond the doorway and within the privacy of the home. 
                                                                                                             
the home).  But see Marino, supra note 11 at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have 
interpreted and applied the principles of Payton differently which has caused a circuit split 
on the issue of warrantless open doorway arrests). 
140 Citron, supra note 11, at 2786 (contending that the circuits are in dispute over deciding 
cases involving warrantless doorway arrests and two conflicting views, referred to as the 
“voluntary exposure view[]” and “sanctity view,” have been adopted by the circuits in an 
attempt to resolve such cases). 
141 Id. at 2786 (explaining that the “voluntary exposure view” refers to the position that 
plain view seizures at the threshold of the doorway do not constitute Fourth Amendment 
violations because the threshold of the doorway is a public place, and an individual in a 
public place cannot claim any legitimate expectation of privacy); id. at 2796 (explaining that 
the “sanctity view[]” refers to the position that a person who opens his door in response to 
the knock of a police officer does not surrender his privacy interest such that an officer may 
conduct a plain view seizure at the threshold). 
142 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Santana decision); supra note 36 (explaining the 
Santana principle). 
143 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Payton decision); supra note 44 (explaining the 
Payton principle). 
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C. The Decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish v. 
Nugent Abandoned Both Existing United States Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals Precedent 
In McClish, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to uphold 
a warrantless doorway arrest.144  This decision was inconsistent with the 
principles set forth in Santana, Payton, and other circuit cases addressing 
this issue.145  Because an actual entry into the home was not made and no 
coercive tactics were used by police to force the defendant to open his 
door, Part III.C.1 explains why McClish was incorrectly decided and the 
defendant’s warrantless arrest should have been upheld as valid under 
Santana and other cases decided by the Courts of Appeals. 
1. The Eleventh Circuit Disregards Both the Public Place and Voluntary 
Exposure Principles of Santana 
In declining to uphold defendant McClish’s warrantless doorway 
arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the principles 
explained in Santana governing such arrests.146  First, the court refused to 
recognize that the threshold of the doorway is a public place and an area 
in which a warrantless arrest is permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment.147  In McClish, the defendant voluntarily opened his door in 
response to a knock from the arresting officers and the record supports a 
finding that the defendant remained within the general area of the 
doorway after he opened the door.148  However, merely because McClish 
                                                 
144 See supra note 100 (holding that a warrantless open doorway arrest is a prohibited 
entry into the private confines of the home which violates the Fourth Amendment and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Payton). 
145 See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in McClish disregards the pubic place and voluntary exposure principles that 
formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding warrantless open doorway 
arrests in Santana); supra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in McClish misinterprets the protections emphasized in Payton, namely 
that Payton only protects an individual’s right of privacy in terms of what he or she has not 
knowingly exposed to public view). 
146 See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle). 
147 See supra note 78 (explaining the manner in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals interpreted the facts surrounding the warrantless arrest of the Defendant McClish 
and arguing that McClish was standing within the privacy of his home at the time of his 
arrest). 
148 See id. at 1235.  The facts, taken most favorably to the defendant, state that McClish 
“went to the door, and opened it[]” after he heard a knock from the police.  Id.  The 
arresting officer “was standing on the porch, directly in front of the open door,” and he 
“reached into the house, [and] grabbed [McClish][.]”  Id. at 1235–36.  It would therefore 
seem logical that McClish, by opening the door, must have been within the general vicinity 
of the doorway at this time. 
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lived in a trailer, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to 
acknowledge that McClish was actually standing in the threshold of the 
doorway.149 
Even though McClish averred that he had been standing completely 
inside his home at the time of his arrest, the idea that one could open a 
door and not be near the threshold of the doorway simply defies logic.150  
In spite of this, based on an erroneous finding that no threshold of the 
doorway apparently existed in McClish’s trailer, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals invalidated McClish’s arrest on the grounds that 
McClish had not been in a public place at the time of the warrantless 
arrest.151  Such reasoning is clearly contrary to Santana because it 
completely disregards the Supreme Court’s holding that the threshold of 
the doorway is considered a public area for purposes of arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment.152  The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals also draws an arbitrary distinction between trailer homes and 
other types of residences for purposes of warrantless doorway arrest.  
Apparently, a clearly delineated threshold of the doorway is only 
present in certain types (or sizes) of dwellings.153  However, courts are 
not architects, and it should not be the task of a court to determine 
                                                 
149 Id. at 1245.  The court emphasized the fact that because McClish lived in a trailer, 
which does not have all “the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber 
between the outer door and the interior of the dwelling[][,]” McClish was already “firmly 
planted” within the privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the 
officers and stood behind the door.  Id.  Based upon this reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals impliedly held that a definable threshold of the doorway does not exist 
based on the mere fact that the defendant McClish lived in a trailer.  This erroneous finding 
allowed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to reason that because no threshold existed 
in McClish’s trailer, he had actually been “standing firmly inside the living room of his 
home” at the time of his arrest.  Id.  Thus, by simply opening the door and standing in the 
doorway, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an individual actually 
remains in the living room and privacy of his trailer rather than in the public area of the 
doorway’s threshold.  Id. 
150 Id. at 1236.  The facts indicate that “McClish unambiguously stated that [he] had been 
standing completely inside the home at the time[]” of his arrest.  Id.  The author of this 
Note contends that it would not be possible for a person to be able to fully open a door and 
still remain within the privacy of his home.  By opening the door, a person would 
necessarily have to be within the area of the doorway or he would not be able to grab hold 
of the doorknob and pull the door open. 
151 Id. at 1248 (holding that a warrantless open doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into 
the private confines of the home which violates the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Payton). 
152 See supra note 33 (holding that the defendant Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid 
because she knowingly exposed herself to police officers in the doorway of her home, 
which is a public place). 
153 McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (stressing that the Defendant 
McClish’s trailer did not have “a definable chamber between the outer door and the 
interior of the dwelling[]”); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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precisely whether a threshold can be found to exist in a particular type of 
residence.154 
More importantly, the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals gives no weight to the fact that McClish had voluntarily opened 
the door to police, which was the key factor the Supreme Court had relied 
on in upholding the validity of the defendant’s arrest in Santana.155  The 
police did not use coercive tactics to force McClish to open his door and 
no constructive entry was made; McClish simply heard a knock at the 
door and opened it.156  By invalidating McClish’s warrantless open 
doorway arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not merely 
ignore the principles of Santana that it should have applied to uphold the 
arrest; it went directly against those principles and blatantly 
misconstrued decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals to support its 
erroneous holding.157  Furthermore, the court engaged in a lengthy 
                                                 
154 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 257.  LaFave argues that the idea that a suspect cannot be 
subjected to a warrantless arrest while standing at the threshold of the doorway is unsound 
because “it means that whether a particular warrantless arrest turns out to be lawful . . . 
often depend[s] upon nothing more than whether the arresting officer had the prescience to 
testify that the defendant was ‘in’ the doorway rather than ‘at’ it, or ‘on’ the threshold 
rather than ‘by’ it.”  Id.  LaFave also notes that “even if courts could be expected to sort out 
the ‘in’-‘at’ and ‘on’-‘by’ distinctions on a regular basis, one cannot help but wonder why 
that burden should be imposed upon them.”  Id. 
155 McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247 (emphasizing that “McClish did not completely surrender or 
forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when he opened the door, including, most 
notably, the right to be secure within his home from a warrantless arrest[]”).  But see supra 
note 35 (noting that because Santana had knowingly exposed herself to the public in the 
doorway of her home, she no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment).  See also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1256 n.5 (Anderson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that because the Court in Santana said that arrests on the threshold of the 
doorway without a warrant are legal and “common sense tells us that an officer conducting 
an arrest at the literal threshold [of the doorway] would necessarily cross the plane of the 
door in a great many threshold arrests[][,]” the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with 
Santana); supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle). 
156 Id. at 1235 n.7 (explaining that an affidavit had stated that McClish simply opened the 
door following the knock of police, while McClish had stated at a deposition that he asked 
who was at the door and opened it after the police announced their presence). 
157 Id. at 1248.  In reasoning that McClish had not surrendered his reasonable expectation 
of privacy by voluntarily opening his door to police, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied on United States v. McCraw, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held “that a 
person does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the officers’ entry by 
[partially] [opening the door] [to determine the identity of officers knocking on the door], and [the 
defendant’s] arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment and . . . Payton.”  Id. at 1247 (citing United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 
228 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)).  However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
blatantly misconstrued the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by 
explaining that McCraw simply held that “a person does not surrender his expectation of 
privacy nor consent to the officers’ entry by [opening the door,] and [the defendant’s] arrest 
inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the [f]ourth [a]mendment and . . . 
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discussion attempting to determine McClish’s precise location in the 
doorway even though the circuit courts have consistently determined 
that this factor has little bearing on the validity of the arrest if the 
individual has already surrendered his reasonable expectation of 
privacy.158 
Because it disregards the scope of Fourth Amendment protections 
linked to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the decision 
of the Eleventh Circuit in McClish represents a confused analysis of the 
issues at stake in warrantless doorway arrest cases.159  The facts of 
McClish make it apparent that the decision simply called for an 
application of the principles of Santana because an individual who 
knowingly stands in the doorway is no longer in an area where he can 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy.160  The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, did not see it that way. 
2. The McClish Decision Misinterprets the Protections That Payton 
Actually Emphasized 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also errantly justified its 
decision to invalidate McClish’s warrantless arrest by emphasizing that 
                                                                                                             
Payton.”  McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247 (citing McCraw, 920 F.2d at 228) (emphasis added).  The 
facts of McCraw clearly indicate that the defendant did not fully open his door to arresting 
officers as McClish had done.  See McCraw, 920 F.2d at 226 (explaining that the defendant 
heard a knock at the door, opened the door “about halfway while standing inside his 
room[][,]” and then “attempted to close the door[]” when he saw the arresting officers).  
But see McClish, 483 F.3d at 1235 (stating that McClish himself “averred that [the arresting 
officer] was standing on the porch, directly in front of the open door,” after McClish had 
opened it).  Because McClish had fully opened his door to arresting officers and made no 
attempt to close the door when he saw them at his doorway, any reliance on McCraw by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is not only unpersuasive but simply incorrect. 
158 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing various cases in which the circuit courts have held 
that the arrested individual’s precise location in the doorway is not the dispositive issue to 
be examined in warrantless doorway arrest cases); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1263–64 
(Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that the issue at stake in McClish and similar cases is 
not the specific location of the arrested individual in the doorway, but whether the 
arresting officers violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy in making the 
arrest). 
159 See supra Part III.A (arguing that the circuit courts have found the important issues in 
warrantless doorway arrest cases to be:  (1) the threshold of the doorway is a public place 
and therefore an area in which a valid warrantless arrest can be made, and (2) once an 
individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual surrenders his reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
160 See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1253–
54 (Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that McClish’s case was “legally indistinguishable 
from Santana[]” based on the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the door in response to a 
knock by police, and thus ‘“knowingly expose[d]’ both himself and the immediate area 
behind his threshold to public view[]”). 
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police made an actual entry into McClish’s trailer.161  The facts of McClish 
indicate that no such entry was made, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals was able to conclude only that an actual entry occurred because 
it refused to recognize that a clearly delineated threshold of the doorway 
exists within a trailer home.162  Furthermore, even though the arresting 
officer in McClish reached into the open doorway to grab hold of the 
defendant and complete the arrest, these actions did not rise to the types 
of in-home entries and invasions of privacy that Payton serves to 
protect.163 
This principle is clear because the circuit courts have interpreted the 
zone of privacy sought to be protected by Payton to extend beyond the 
threshold of the doorway itself by continuously holding that the 
threshold can be breached only when an arresting officer physically 
places his entire person within the home.164  It is apparent that after 
                                                 
161 Id. at 1235–36.  The court explained that after McClish voluntarily opened the door to 
the police, one of the officers reached into the house through the open door, grabbed 
McClish as he stood in the doorway, and pulled him out onto the trailer’s porch to effect 
the arrest.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that this amounted to an actual 
entry into the home which violated the principles of Payton.  Id. at 1248. 
162 Id. at 1245 (stressing the fact that because McClish lived in a trailer, which does not 
have “all of the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber between the outer 
door and the interior of the dwelling[][,]” McClish was already “firmly planted” within the 
privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the officers and stood behind 
the door). 
163 See supra note 41 (explaining the Supreme Court in Payton held that a warrantless 
arrest inside the home, absent exigent circumstances such as consent, is an unlawful 
invasion of an individual’s right to privacy that cannot be allowed even when probable 
cause exists); supra note 98 (explaining that Payton does not hold or suggest that the home 
is a sanctuary from reasonable police investigation; rather, Payton protects an individual’s 
privacy interest, even within the home, only in terms of what the individual has not 
knowingly exposed to public view); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1254 (Anderson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that Payton, unlike Santana, “was not a doorway arrest case[]” but decided only 
the narrow issue of when and under what circumstances an officer may enter the interior of 
a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest); see also LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 257 
(suggesting that based upon Payton, if a warrantless arrest at the doorway can be 
accomplished without entry into the home, then “it should be deemed lawful 
notwithstanding the absence of a warrant, even if the arrestee was just inside rather than on 
the threshold at that time[]”). 
164 See supra note 70 (discussing cases in which courts have deemed warrantless doorway 
arrests invalid because the arresting officers explicitly walked past the threshold of the 
doorway and into the privacy of the home to make the arrests); see also Sparing v. Village of 
Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that because the defendant’s 
arrest was not made at the doorway or threshold of the doorway but was actually 
conducted after the police walked into his home without his consent, the arrest violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1254 (Anderson, J., 
concurring) (stressing that in Payton, the arresting officers penetrated well into the interior 
of the defendant’s home by doing more than simply reaching through an open door as the 
arresting officers had done in McClish). 
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probable cause exists for an individual’s arrest and he has voluntarily 
opened his doorway to police, the arresting officer does not violate 
Payton by simply reaching into an open doorway and grabbing hold of 
the individual.165  In this situation, the arresting officer’s entire person 
has by no means intruded past the threshold of the doorway, and the 
rule of Payton has no authoritative bearing upon the validity of the 
arrest.166  In the end, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals improperly 
relied on the principles of Payton and distorted the facts of the case to 
uphold the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest in McClish. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
This Note argues that circuit courts have consistently applied 
Supreme Court precedent to resolve warrantless doorway arrest cases 
and the conflict among the circuits on this issue did not arise until the 
McClish decision.167  McClish was improperly decided, and the confused 
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals could lead to further 
misapplication of the principles of Santana and Payton.168  However, a 
more explicitly defined standard will help properly resolve future cases 
dealing with warrantless doorway arrests.  This suggested model 
                                                 
165 See supra note 35 (explaining that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection); see also 
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1257 (Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]he Santana rule is 
consistent with Payton’s privacy-protection rationale[]” because “Santana simply says that 
when a suspect has voluntarily relinquished the privacy of the home in the doorway area, 
the Payton concern for the privacy of the home is not present and the public arrest rule of 
Watson applies[]”); LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258 (suggesting that if the arrestee, after 
opening the door to arresting officers, does not retreat from the door and “the police officer 
merely reaches in [the home] to manifest the fact of arrest, such a de minimis breaking of 
the vertical plane above the threshold should not itself make the warrantless arrest 
unlawful[]”); supra note 33 (holding that the doorway of a home is a public place, and that 
a warrantless arrest made at the doorway after a defendant has voluntarily exposed herself 
to public view is valid under the Fourth Amendment). 
166 See supra note 44 (stating the Payton principle); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1257 
(Anderson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that if a suspect chooses to open the door to 
arresting officers, “the officers do not offend the rationale of Payton by simply reaching in 
and grabbing him[][;]” the rule of Santana allows police to seize a suspect who is standing 
“within reach of the officer standing at the threshold [of the doorway] because the officer 
does not thereby intrude further on the suspect’s privacy than what the suspect had 
voluntarily relinquished[]” by opening the door). 
167 See supra Parts III.A–B (arguing that the circuit courts have consistently applied 
Supreme Court precedent to resolve warrantless doorway arrest cases and that the Santana 
and Payton decisions can easily co-exist because they speak to entirely different scenarios of 
warrantless arrest). 
168 See supra Part III.C (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
in McClish abandoned existing precedent on the issue of warrantless doorway arrests and 
was based upon flawed reasoning by the majority). 
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approach, taking aspects from the Santana and Payton decisions as well 
as from other cases discussed in this Note decided by the Courts of 
Appeals, will curtail virtually any ambiguities surrounding these arrests 
through a firm and easy-to-apply standard. 
Part IV.A proposes a standard of model judicial reasoning that 
should be applied to cases dealing with warrantless doorway arrests and 
emphasizes that the voluntary exposure of the defendant to arresting 
officers should be the sole determinative factor in resolving these types 
of cases.169  Then, Part IV.B addresses how the model standard addresses 
the use of coercive police activity in warrantless doorway arrest cases 
and explains why the precise location of the defendant in the doorway at 
the time of his arrest should have absolutely no bearing on its validity.170  
A. The Proposed Model Standard 
Based on the historical protections emphasized by the Fourth 
Amendment, Supreme Court precedent, and decisions by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals regarding warrantless doorway arrests, the validity of 
a warrantless doorway arrest should hinge solely upon the following 
determination:  whether the arrested individual surrendered his reasonable 
expectation of privacy by opening his door and voluntarily exposing his person 
to police officers standing outside.171  If the arrested individual has opened 
the door to his dwelling in any way and surrendered his reasonable 
expectation of privacy by voluntarily exposing his person to police 
officers standing outside, this model approach operates to uphold all 
instances of warrantless arrest regardless of the precise location of the 
                                                 
169 See infra Part IV.A. 
170 See infra Parts IV.B.1–2. 
171 In order for a warrantless doorway arrest to be upheld under the voluntary exposure 
test, the suspect himself must, in almost all cases, be the individual that opens the door to 
the arresting officers.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton, if another 
individual within the home opens the door and the suspect can be seen inside the home but 
does not come to the door, a warrantless arrest cannot be carried out because the suspect 
himself did not voluntarily expose himself to the arresting officers in the doorway.  See 
supra notes 40–44 (explaining that in Riddick, the companion case to Payton, the defendant’s 
warrantless arrest was invalidated based upon principles of actual entry after the 
defendant’s son opened the door to arresting officers, the officers saw the defendant in bed 
covered by a sheet through the open doorway, and the officers subsequently entered the 
home and arrested him).  The sole exception to this scenario is laid out by LaFave in his 
Fourth Amendment treatise:  in a situation where the arresting officer knocks on the door, 
another occupant of the home answers the door, the occupant is told of the officer’s 
intention to arrest the defendant who is inside the home, the occupant informs the 
defendant of the officer’s intention, and the defendant still comes to the door to meet the 
arresting officer, his arrest would be valid under the Fourth Amendment and standard of 
model reasoning proposed in this Note.  See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 259 (emphasis 
added). 
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individual in the doorway at the time of the arrest or the manner in 
which the door was opened.172  Warrantless arrests have historically 
been deemed to implicate “‘right of privacy’” issues rather than arbitrary 
precise location issues, and this model approach emphasizes the former, 
rather than the latter, factor as determinative.173 
Although this model approach proposes a controversial standard of 
analysis, its focus on principles of voluntary exposure flows directly 
from the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on protecting each individual’s 
right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.174  This protection is not 
absolute, however, and can easily be surrendered because it applies to 
individuals rather than specific places.175  In other words, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not protect an individual simply because his 
body remains in a certain place, like a home; it protects such an 
individual if he has not taken an action that is inconsistent with 
maintaining the privacy of his person, like exposing himself to public 
view by voluntarily opening a door. 
It is clearly reasonable for an individual to maintain an expectation 
of privacy if he remains within his home and does not respond to a 
knock at his door, no matter who might be outside.  By not opening the 
door, the individual has acted in a manner consistent with maintaining 
                                                 
172 The model standard draws no distinction between situations in which the individual 
partially opens the door to see who is outside, quickly opens and closes the door after he 
sees the arresting officers, or fully opens the door with blatant disregard for whoever 
stands outside because in all of these instances, the individual has engaged in behavior 
inconsistent with a desire for the privacy of his person to remain undisturbed.  See supra 
note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that what a person knowingly 
exposes to public view, even within his own home, is not subject to the protections offered 
by the Fourth Amendment). 
173 See supra note 109 (explaining that historically, the protections of privacy embodied by 
the Fourth Amendment have been held to apply to people rather than places, and hence 
protect the individual himself rather than his home). 
174 See supra note 27 (explaining that each individual has a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and stating that the Court 
in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon 
whether the individual who claims such protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the invaded area); see also Lewis, supra note 24 (explaining that the protection of privacy 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is aimed at the protection of 
the individual); Jones, supra note 27 (stating that the concept of “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” is the starting point for Fourth Amendment analysis). 
175 See supra note 24 (explaining that the Court held in Katz that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people rather than places); see also supra note 17 (citing the text of the Fourth 
Amendment).  It should be noted that because the Fourth Amendment itself refers to 
protecting a “right” of people to remain secure from unreasonable seizures in their persons 
and homes, the use of the word “right” indicates that the privacy interest can be forfeited. 
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his right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.176  However, by freely 
opening the door to police standing outside, the individual can no longer 
maintain a right of privacy.177 
B. Other Important Aspects Addressed by the Proposed Model Standard 
In order for the model standard proposed in this Note to have any 
practical implications, courts addressing the validity of these types of 
arrests must look more closely at the circumstances surrounding each 
arrest.  Courts must place a much heavier emphasis on determining 
whether arresting officers used coercive tactics to force the defendant to 
appear at his doorway because only in such instances would a 
defendant’s exposure be involuntary.178  No emphasis, however, needs to 
be placed on the defendant’s precise location in the doorway at the time 
of his arrest because such issues are truly extraneous to the warrantless 
doorway arrest scenario.179 
1. Coercive Police Activity Taking Place at the Time of the Arrest 
A key factor that must play a role in determining the validity of an 
arrest under the voluntary exposure analysis is the presence of coercive 
police activity at the time of the arrest.  If an individual is forced to 
expose himself to police maintaining a presence outside of his home 
based on the belief that he must submit to their authority, the individual 
has not surrendered his reasonable expectation of privacy because his 
exposure to the police was not voluntary.180  However, because 
voluntary exposure operates as the defining principle in this model 
approach, a more specific definition of “coercive police conduct” must be 
set forth to ensure that the arrested individual truly opened the door to 
police out of his own free will.181 
                                                 
176 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258–59 (explaining that if in a particular case in which no 
exigent circumstances exist and the intended arrestee does not answer the door but instead 
“elects to exercise the security of the premises by not submitting to the arrest, then it is 
hardly unfair that the police should be required to withdraw and return another time with 
a warrant[]”). 
177 See supra note 35 (holding that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own house or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection). 
178 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
179 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
180 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing warrantless doorway arrests involving coercive 
tactics by police and arguing that in these types of situations, the exposure of the defendant 
to police is not truly voluntary). 
181 See supra note 74 (explaining that “coercive police conduct” refers to such a show of 
authority that the defendant reasonably believes that he has no choice but to comply with 
the requests of police). 
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In this model approach, “coercive activity” by arresting officers 
includes behavior identified in circuit court decisions examined earlier in 
this Note182 as well as misrepresentation of the identities of the officers to 
the suspect, verbal threats made by the officers to the suspect, 
maintaining a continued, visible police presence outside of the residence 
until the suspect opens his door, and similar attempts at coercion and 
deception.  The focus underlying whether behavior of police qualifies as 
coercive activity centers around whether the suspect reasonably believed 
that he had no reasonable choice but to open his door and expose himself 
to arresting officers. 
2. The Precise Location of the Defendant at the Time of the Arrest 
Based on this model approach, if courts faced with determining the 
constitutionality of warrantless doorway arrests base their analysis on 
principles of voluntary exposure, they must ignore the precise location of 
the defendant at the time of the arrest.  One would have to be somewhat 
near the doorway to be able to successfully open a door anyway, and 
factoring the location of the defendant into the analysis only serves to 
create ambiguities and obscure line-drawing scenarios for courts.  It 
would be virtually impossible to create a workable standard to define 
the precise area of the threshold of the doorway in different types of 
residences, and using this type of standard would inevitably lead to 
conflicts as to whether the defendant was actually in the doorway, a step 
back from the doorway, or somehow “firmly planted inside” the home 
after opening the door at the time of the arrest.183 
By ignoring the location of the defendant at the time of the arrest, it 
will be easier for courts to distinguish doorway arrests from in-home 
arrests based solely on the voluntary exposure principle.  Because the 
facts of warrantless doorway arrest cases will never be identical, it does 
not make sense to base the analysis on an arbitrary factor such as the 
actual location of the defendant which will invariably differ on a case-by-
case basis.  Hence, the most logical working standard revolves around 
                                                 
182 See supra note 131 (discussing examples of police coercion, such as flooding the 
defendant’s house with spotlights and summoning the defendant from the home with the 
blaring call of a bullhorn, surrounding the doorway of the defendant’s residence and 
ordering him to emerge with weapons drawn, turning off the power to the defendant’s 
residence, setting off a “‘flash-bang’” device at the defendant’s residence, and throwing 
tear gas into a defendant’s residence). 
183 See supra note 78 (explaining that because the defendant McClish’s residence did not 
have “the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber between the outer door 
and the interior of the dwelling[,]” McClish was already “firmly planted” within the 
privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to police and stood behind the 
door). 
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the suggested model approach of voluntary exposure.  Not only does the 
model approach find an appropriate basis in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because it protects the rights of individuals rather than 
particular locations, the model approach is also conducive to analysis in 
almost every type of situation due to its clear and simple standards.184 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Flash back to John Smith’s warrantless arrest at his apartment.  After 
Smith opens the door, the officers advise him that he is under arrest and 
one of the officers grabs Smith’s arm to handcuff him and carry out the 
arrest.  Under the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
McClish, the police would be violating Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights 
by arresting him even though he voluntarily opened his door to the 
officers and stood at the doorway.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals would preoccupy itself with determining the precise location of 
Smith at the time of his arrest and would reason that although Smith 
opened the door to the arresting officers, he was still within the privacy 
of his home at that time.  Applying the model reasoning suggested in 
this Note, however, Smith’s arrest would be upheld regardless of 
whether he stood at, near, on, or slightly behind the threshold of the 
doorway.  Because Smith voluntarily opened his door to the arresting 
officers who maintained a brief, non-coercive presence outside of his 
apartment and did not enter past the threshold and into Smith’s 
apartment to make the arrest, the officers did not violate Smith’s right of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
This Note has clarified that warrantless open doorway arrests are 
constitutionally valid and ultimately consistent with Fourth Amendment 
principles and Supreme Court precedent.  In line with the existing 
standards set forth in both the Santana and Payton decisions, these types 
of arrests should only be found invalid in two instances:  (1) if arresting 
officers enter beyond the threshold and into the privacy of the home to 
make the arrest absent consent from the suspect, and (2) if arresting 
officers employ coercive tactics that force the suspect to involuntarily 
expose himself at the doorway. 
Although it may seem that prior to McClish, decisions by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals dealing with warrantless doorway arrests were based 
on an unclear standard, this is simply untrue.  The principles of Santana 
                                                 
184 See supra note 24 (explaining the Katz Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people rather than places); see also Lewis, supra note 24 (explaining that the protection of 
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is aimed at the 
protection of the individual). 
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and Payton are distinct and have been consistently applied by the circuit 
courts either to uphold or invalidate warrantless arrests regardless of 
whether the courts expressly relied on these principles.185  Although the 
McClish decision resulted in a circuit split on the constitutionality of 
warrantless doorway arrests, it was incorrectly decided by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Because the arrest at issue in McClish did not 
implicate the protections emphasized in Payton, the arrest should have 
been upheld consistent with the principles in Santana.186 
This Note has ultimately maintained the view that McClish is a 
unique and improperly reasoned decision on the issue of warrantless 
open doorway arrests.  Courts faced with resolving cases dealing with 
these types of arrests must be cautious not to rely on the reasoning set 
forth by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals because it would be 
irrational to expect judges to apply an arbitrary standard of analysis that 
defies precedent established by both the Supreme Court and the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals.  Instead, to ensure consistency among the circuits, 
courts that address the constitutionality of warrantless doorway arrests 
should either apply the distinct principles of Santana and Payton, or 
apply a more explicitly defined standard such as the model standard 
proposed in this Note. 
Christopher J. Rados∗ 
                                                 
185 See supra Part III.A (explaining that the circuit courts have upheld warrantless 
doorway arrest cases based on the Supreme Court’s holding that the threshold of the 
doorway is a public place and therefore an area in which a valid warrantless arrest can be 
made, and that once an individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual 
surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); supra Part 
III.B (arguing that although the circuit courts have declined to uphold warrantless doorway 
arrests in certain cases, the decisions have been consistent with Santana and Payton because 
the cases involved either the use of coercive police tactics to force the defendant to 
involuntarily come to the doorway, or actual entry by arresting officers past the threshold 
of the doorway and into the privacy of the home to make the arrest). 
186 See supra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in McClish disregards both the public place and voluntary exposure principles that 
formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding warrantless open doorway 
arrests in Santana); supra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the McClish decision misinterprets the 
protections that had originally been emphasized in Payton). 
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